ENFORCING THE FEDERAL WATER RESOURCE
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From the earliest years of this country's history, the federal courts have
recognized the importance of American waterways in interstate and foreign
commerce and have acknowledged that the power to regulate the use of
water resources is included within the more general federal power to regulate commerce. I Although most of the nation's submerged and tidal lands
are owned by the states or by private individuals who derive their rights
from the states, the federal government retains important powers to limit the
use of such properties. Under the commerce clause, 2 the government has the
power to regulate and control many of the ways in which riparian lands can
be used and developed. 3 In effect, the people of the United States possess an
inchoate easement guaranteeing use of the nation's water resources to
persons engaged in activities related to commerce. Where Congress takes
affirmative action, owners of riparian or submerged land may be obliged to
refrain from activities which impair uses of the waters which inundate their
property. Potentially, the rights protected by this easement are as varied as
the number of commercial possibilities for the use of water. But it must be
emphasized that the public may not enjoy any of its inchoate easement rights
*
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THE FOLLOWING CITATIONS WILL BE USED IN THIS ARTICLE:
Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816
(codified at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251 et seq. (Supp. IV 1974))[hereinafter cited as FWPCA];
Riveis and Harbors Appropriation Act of 1890, Act of Sept. 19, 1890, ch. 907, § 7, 26 Stat.
454 [hereinafter cited as 1890 Act];
Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act of 1899, Act. of Mar. 3,1899, ch. 425, §§ 9-17, 19-20,
30 Stat. 1121 (codified at 33 U.S.C. §§ 401, 403-404, 406-409, 411, 413-415 (1970) [hereinafter
cited as the 1899 Act].
1. In Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 190 (1824), Chief Justice Marshall noted the
origins of the federal government's power to control activities which affect the flow of water
transportation:
All America understands, and has uniformly understood, the word "commerce," to
comprehend navigation. It was so understood, and must have been so understood,
when the constitution was framed. The power over commerce, including navigation,
was one of the primary objects for which the people of America adopted their
government, and must have been contemplated-in forming it.
2. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
3. E.g., United States v. Appalachian Power Co., 311 U.S. 377, 426-27 (1940), quoted in
text accompanying note 35 infra. See notes 26-53 infra and accompanying text.
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until Congress has acted affirmatively
to bring them into existence and to
4
provide for their enforcement.
To date, the method which Congress has customarily selected for
giving substance to public water resource rights has been the enactment of
federal restrictions on private activities in or around waters and adjacent
wetlands. The substance of these restrictions has been widely discussed in
both the academic community and the political arena. 5 However, bringing
inchoate rights into existence means little if those rights are not enforced.
An easement owner is in no better position than a stranger to the burdened
land if he cannot effectively prevent or abate inconsistent uses. Similarly,
without an effective method of controlling inconsistent uses, the public's
rights in the nation's water resources may have little practical value.
Unfortunately, enforcement of federal controls on water resource use is
considerably more difficult and complex than the protection of rights under
a conventional easement. An easement holder seeking relief in the courts is

normally concerned only with vindication of his property rights. On the
other hand, government efforts to protect water resource uses for the public
embrace a nation-wide program involving a variety of geographical settings,
policy considerations, equities and public interests. 6 In the past, administrative and judicial enforcement proceedings have tended to resolve each
enforcement case on an ad hoc basis. The danger with this approach is that it
4. See Willson v. Black-bird Creek Marsh Co., 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 245, 252 (1829). There
Chief Justice Marshall referred to the federal power to protect the public's right to unrestricted
navigation as a power "in its dormant state" which did not affect state or private rights in the
absence of express congressional legislation. The case involved the constitutionality of a
Delaware statute which authorized the construction of a dam across a navigable stream. In
holding that the statute was constitutional in the absence of federal legislation guaranteeing the
right to navigate along such streams, the Supreme Court observed:
If congress had passed any act which bore upon the case; any act in execution of the
power to regulate commerce, the object of which was to control state legislation over
those small navigable creeks into which the tide flows, and which abound throughout
the lower country of the middle and southern states; we should feel not much
difficulty in saying, that a state law coming to conflict with such act would be void.
Id.
5. See, e.g., HOUSE COMM. ON GOV'T OPERATIONS, OUR WATERS AND WETLANDS: How
THE CORPS OF ENGINEERS CAN HELP PREVENT THEIR DESTRUCTION AND POLLUTION, H.R. REP.

No. 91-917, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970); S. REP. No. 92-414, 92d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1971)(FWPCA); S. REP. No. 92-1236, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (Conf. Rep. 1972) (FWPCA);
Kramon, Section 10 of the Rivers and Harbors Act: The Emergence of a New Protectionfor
Tidal Marshes, 33 MD. L. REV. 229 (1973); Teclaff, The CoastalZone-Controlover Encroachments into the Tidewaters, 1 J. MAR. L. & COM. 241 (1970); Comment, The Federal Water
Pollution ControlAct Amendments of 1972, 14 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 672 (1973).
6. Cf. United States v. Joseph G. Moretti, Inc., 526 F.2d 1306 (5th Cir. 1976)(developer's
dredging of canals affects the condition of navigable waters, subjecting developer to jurisdiction of Corps of Engineers). Where, however, the government is attempting to enforce its
proprietary, as opposed to regulatory, easement rights, it appears to stand in the same position
as a private landowner. See United States v. Sea Gate, Inc., 397 F. Supp. 1351 (E.D.N.C.
1975)(action to enforce rights under waterway easement acquired by express reservation).
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frequently produces different results in apparently similar cases and consequently undermines public confidence in the federal regulatory program as a
whole. Recent developments indicate, however, that administrators and
courts have begun to address this problem and have moved toward a more
programmatic approach to enforcing federal water resource controls. After a
general discussion of the restrictions which Congress has sought to impose
on owners of submerged and riparian lands, this Article will examine some
of the current developments in the federal enforcement effort and will seek
to define the basic issues that seem likely to dominate future administrative
and judicial enforcement proceedings.

I. THE GROWTH OF FEDERAL INTEREST IN REGULATING
WATER RESOURCE USE

Throughout the first hundred years of this country's history, watercourses were among the most important arteries of transportation. It is not
surprising, therefore, that navigation was the first water resource use to be
placed within the scope of federal regulation. Beginning in the early years of
the nineteenth century, the inherent power of the national government to
regulate activities which might interfere with the public's right to move
freely along navigable waters was frequently acknowledged, 7 but the courts
also emphasized repeatedly that exercises of this power would not be
implied and that affirmative action by Congress was necessary to place
navigation under federal control. 8 Congress was slow to accept this mandate
and made no serious effort to regulate the navigability of the waters of the
United States throughout most of the nineteenth century. 9 During this
period, the business of regulating activities that tended to obstruct the
navigability of waters was left largely in the hands of the individual states. 10
As late as 1888, the Supreme Court noted an absence of federal means to
prevent even a 1serious obstruction to the navigation of a commercially
1
important river.
7. See, e.g., Gilman v. Philadelphia, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 713,724-25 (1866); United States v.
Coombs, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 72, 78 (1838). See also Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 190
(1824). The relevant portion of the Gibbons opinion is quoted in note 1 supra.
8. See, e.g., Pound v. Turck, 95 U.S. 459, 462-64 (1878) and cases cited therein. But cf.
Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91 (1972)(water pollution may be abated in an action
based on federal common law nuisance even in the absence of congressional legislation).
9. All that existed were a few isolated legislative efforts such as the Northwest Ordinance
of 1787, which included a provision that streams which flowed into the Mississippi or St.
Lawrence Rivers should be "common highways, and forever free." Northwest Ordinance of
1787, art. IV, I Stat. 52 (1789).
10. In the absence of legislation bringing dormant federal regulatory powers into existence,
the states appear to have had full responsibility for regulating obstructions to navigation of
water within their borders. E.g., Willamette Iron Bridge Co. v. Hatch, 125 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1888);
Pound v. Turck, 95 U.S. 459, 462-64 (1878).
11. Willamette Iron Bridge Co. v. Hatch, 125 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1888).
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The Rivers and HarborsAppropriation Act of 1890
Congress made its first attempt to establish plenary federal control over

obstructions to navigability in the Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act of
1890.12 The Act of 1890 prohibited, inter alia, "the creation of any

obstruction, not affirmatively authorized by law, to the navigable capacity
of any waters, in respect of which the United States has jurisdiction."' 3 This
was the first serious effort to exert federal control over the nation's waters
for the purpose of reserving certain uses of those resources to the public.
The approach to federal regulation embodied in the 1890 Act set the pattern

for future legislation. Unlike previous efforts, which had sought to establish
federal jurisdiction over specific bodies of water, the 1890 statute was
directed toward the creation and protection of a public right of unrestricted
navigation over any body of water susceptible to that use. 4 The Act was
designed to accomplish its objective by restricting activities that were

inconsistent with navigability.
B.

The Rivers and HarborsAppropriation Act of 1899
Less than a decade after the passage of the 1890 Act, Congress

considered it necessary to legislate again. Through a flaw in draftsmanship,
the 1890 Act had failed to establish plenary federal control over obstructions to navigation.15 Moreover, Congress perceived a need to consolidate
under one statute all the existing federal law affecting the public's right to
use the waters of the United States as highways of trade. 16 The result was the
12. 1890 Act.
13. The 1890 Act provided in part:
[Tihe creation of any obstruction, not affirmatively authorized by law, to the navigable capacity of any waters, in respect of which the United States has jurisdiction, is
hereby prohibited. The continuance of any such obstruction, except bridges, piers,
docks and wharves, and similar structures erected for business purposes, whether
heretofore or hereafter created, shall constitute an offense and each week's continuance of any such obstruction shall be deemed a separate offense.
Id. § 10.
14. In construing the 1890 Act in United States v. Rio Grande Dam & Irrigation Co., 174
U.S. 690 (1899), the Supreme Court confirmed that the statute was concerned with uses and not
simply federal control over territory. The action had been brought by the United States to
restrain a private company from erecting a dam across an arguably non-navigable portion of the
Rio Grande River. In reversing a dismissal by the lower courts, the Court indicated that the
issue in the case was not whether the dam was being built across a navigable portion of the river
but whether construction would diminish the navigable capacity of any part. Id. at 707-08.
15. The problem resulted from the phrase "any obstruction, not affirmatively authorized
by law," which the Supreme Court construed to mean that obstructions authorized by state law
were excluded from the 1890 Act's prohibition. United States v. Bellingham Bay Boom Co., 176
U.S. 211 (1900).
16. The Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act of 1892, Act of July 13, 1892, ch. 158, § 3,
27 Stat. 110, had amended the 1890 Act by prohibiting three additional activities: (1) the erection
of obstructions to navigation; (2) the erection of bridges over navigable waters without prior
authorization from the Secretary of War; and (3) the unauthorized modification of channels.
Four years later, in the Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act of 1896, Congress directed the
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enactment of twelve sections in the Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act of
1899 establishing various federal controls over the use of navigable waters. 1 7 Perhaps the most important provision of the 1899 Act is section 10,18
which is functionally analogous to the earlier 1890 Act. 19 Both create federal
controls over the nation's waters for transportation purposes, and both have
provisions directed against activities tending to diminish navigability.2 0
There is one important difference, however: while the 1890 Act was directed entirely against obstructive activities, 21 section 10 of the 1899 Act
22
extends regulation to activities which may arguably enhance navigability.

The practical effect of the Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act of
1899 is to encumber state and private ownership of submerged and riparian
lands with a rather complex federal easement for navigation. This easement
operates affirmatively to preserve the right of unrestricted passage over all
navigable waters, except where impediments to navigation are expressly
authorized by Congress. As such, it also restricts the property rights of

owners of land which underlies or adjoins navigable waters. The 1899 Act
empowers the federal government to regulate, prevent or even abate state or
private activities which tend to make navigable or potentially navigable
waters either less or more desirable for navigation. 23 The Act also reaches
activities on "dry land" and in non-navigable waters which may ultimately
24
affect the capacity of navigable waters.
Ostensibly, the 1899 Act was only intended to protect and facilitate
navigation, and early court decisions tended to support this view. 25 The
Secretary of War to make a survey of federal laws relating to navigation and to propose a
comprehensive statute on the subject. Act of June 3, 1896, ch. 314, § 2, 29 Stat. 234. See
generally A. RErrZE, ENVIRONMENTAL PLANNING: LAW OF LAND AND RESOURCES Two-23
through Two-24 (1974) (discussion of the problem of consolidation faced by Congress).
17. 1899 Act.
18. Id. § 10 (codified at 33 U.S.C. § 403 (1970)). See note 55 infra for the text of this
section.
19. See note 13 supra for a partial text of the 1890 Act.
20. Compare 1890 Act, quoted in note 13 supra, with 1899 Act § 10, 33 U.S.C. § 403 (1970),
quoted in note 55 infra.
21. See note 13 supra and accompaning text.
22. Section 10 of the 1899 Act actually has three separate operative provisions. See 1899
Act § 10, 33 U.S.C. § 403 (1970); see also the discussion in notes 55-70 infra and accompanying
text. The third of these prohibits the alteration or modification of any navigable body of water
and may be applied even where a waterway's navigable capacity is actually enhanced. See
notes 63-64 infra and accompanying text.
23. See notes 65-69 infra and accompanying text for a discussion of the term "navigable
water" as it is used in the 1899 Act.
24. 1899 Act § 13, 33 U.S.C. § 407 (1970) prohibits, inter alia, the placement of refuse
material "on the bank of any navigable water, or on the bank of any tributary of any navigable
water" where the material is apt to be introduced into the water so as to impede or obstruct
navigation.
25. In United States v. Banister Realty Co., 155 F. 583 (C.C.E.D.N.Y. 1907), for example,
it was clearly suggested that the 1899 Act could only be invoked to regulate activities in waters
which were actually being used for navigation:
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Supreme Court, however, has adopted a somewhat broader interpretation of
the Act's coverage. In Sanitary District v. United States,26 the Court held
that navigable capacity, and not merely navigation itself, was the object of
federal control.2 7 While this did not suggest that the 1899 Act could be used
for any purpose other than the control of navigability, within the following
decade, dicta from three Supreme Court cases indicated that there might be
additional dimensions to the regulatory powers created by the Act. In New
Jersey v. Sargent28 and Arizona v. California,29the Court clearly implied
that once some connection between an activity and navigability had been
established, the federal government's regulatory power came into play and
could then be exercised to accomplish federal objectives which had nothing
to do with navigation. 30 This suggestion was reiterated with particular
clarity in United States ex rel. Greathouse v. Dern,3 1 where the Court
implied that it was entirely proper for the Secretary of War to refuse to
authorize construction of a wharf on land which the United States was about
It has been frequently held that the admiralty jurisdiction of the United States
attaches to all such bodies of water .

. .,

and this admiralty jurisdiction can be lost

only when the particular water loses the character of a stream capable of carrying on
interstate commerce or of navigation in and out from the ocean for pleasure and
business purposes. Under this construction, Far Rockaway Bay, unless it has so lost
the character of navigability as to be outside of the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the United States courts, is subject to the provisions and regulations of the act
of 1890, as amended by the acts of 1892, 1899 and 1900.
Id. at 595. The case involved an action for an injunction to restrain riparian property owners
from closing an inlet. A preliminary injunction was entered pending adjudication of the issue of
whether the bay in question had lost its navigable character.
26. 266 U.S. 405 (1925).
27. In upholding the right of the United States to bring an action enjoining a state agency
from diverting water from Lake Michigan, the Court explained that "a withdrawal of water on
the scale directed by the statute of Illinois threatens and will affect the level of the Lakes, and
Id. at
that is a matter which cannot be done without the consent of the United States .
426.
28. 269 U.S. 328 (1926).
29. 283 U.S. 423 (1931).
30. New Jersey v. Sargent, 269 U.S. 328 (1926), was an action by the State of New Jersey
for a declaratory judgment that certain portions of the Federal Water Power Act were unconstitutional. The Supreme Court dismissed the case for failure to state a "case or controversy."
Id. at 339-40. In dicta, however, the Court implied that the Act's purpose of establishing federal
control over the production of hydroelectric power could be accomplished pursuant to Congress' constitutionally vested power to regulate activities in navigable waters. Id. at 337.
Arizona v. California, 283 U.S. 423 (193 1), involved a controversy over the construction of
a dam across the Colorado river; the dam was to be built primarily for irrigation purposes. In
considering the federal government's authority to construct the dam, the Court relied on the
power to regulate navigability:
Since the grant of authority to build the dam and reservoir is valid as an exercise
of the Constitutional power to improve navigation, we have no occasion to decide
whether the authority to construct the dam and reservoir might not also have been
constitutionally conferred for the specified purpose of irrigating public lands of the
United States.
Id. at 457 (footnote omitted).
31. 289 U.S. 352 (1933).
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to condemn. Although the structure technically affected navigation, the real
source of the government's concern was that its presence would tend to
increase the cost of condemnation. 32 Dern was actually decided on other
grounds, 33 but it represents the first indication that the 1899 Act might be
used as an instrument for accomplishing a variety of federal objectives in
addition to those related to navigability.
The implication left by the Dern case and its predecessors was that if
even a de minimis connection could be established between an activity and
the navigability of some body of water, the activity was subject to federal
control and could be regulated for any valid national purpose. If the Secretary of War could withhold authorization to build a wharf because its
construction would increase government condemnation costs, it would appear that he could also seek removal of an existing but unauthorized wharf
because its presence would impair the land's future value as a public park.
In United States v. AppalachianElectric Power Co., 34 the Supreme Court
expressed what had previously been only implicit:
In our view, it cannot properly be said that the constitutional power of
the United States over its waters is limited to control for navigation.
. . . In truth the authority of the United States is the regulation of
commerce on its waters. Navigability, in the sense just stated, is but a
part of this whole. . . . The point is that navigable waters are subject
the broad regulation of commerce
to national planning and control in
35
granted the Federal Government.
Clearly, this interpretation of the 1899 Act impresses a broad federal
easement upon submerged and riparian lands. Nevertheless, many years
passed before the federal government began actively to invoke the Rivers
and Harbors Appropriation Act of 1899 to control the use of waters and
inundated lands for purposes essentially unrelated to navigation. During the
three decades following the Dern case, the United States Army Corps of
Engineers, the federal agency with responsibility for administering the 1899
Act, remained concerned primarily with protecting the nation's interest in
navigability, and its administrative permit regulations were directed almost
exclusively toward this end.3 6 Similarly, litigation initiated under the 1899
32. See id. at 355-56.
33. The action was brought for a writ of mandamus to compel the Secretary of War to issue

a permit under section 10 of the 1899 Act, 33 U.S.C. § 403 (1970), for the construction of a
wharf which would extend into the Potomac River from property located within the proposed
site for the George Washington Memorial Parkway. The lower court denied the writ on the
ground that issuing a permit was not a "ministerial act" and, therefore, that mandamus did not
lie. 63 F.2d 137, 141-42 (D.C. Cir. 1933). The Supreme Court affirmed on the rationale that the
potential vindication of petitioners' asserted rights was offset by the harm to the public interest
that the requested relief would surely bring. 289 U.S. at 359-60.
34. 311 U.S. 377 (1940).

35. Id. at 426-27.
36. See CORPS OF

ENGINEERS, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, PERMITS FOR WORK IN NAVIG-
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Act was directed almost entirely toward the prevention and abatement of
37
obstructions to navigation.

C. EnvironmentalEnforcement Under the Commerce Clause
The congressional passage of the Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act
Amendments of 195838 marked the beginning of a new effort by the federal
government to include environmental considerations, such as the protection
of fish and wildlife, in the planning of water resource projects. Originally, it

was uncertain whether the 1958 Amendments were intended to apply to state
and private projects requiring any kind of federal license or only to projects
sponsored by governmental or quasi-governmental bodies. 39 Nevertheless, a

broad view of the Amendments' applicability had clearly taken hold by 1967
when the Secretary of the Army and the Secretary of the Interior entered into

a Memorandum of Understanding delineating the responsibilities of their
respective agencies under the Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act.40 The

agreement provided that all inter-agency communications concerning Department of the Army permit applications would be between the appropriate
District Engineers and Regional Directors of the Fish and Wildlife Service. 41 To promote harmony and cooperation between the two departments,
ABLE WATERS 2 (1962) ("[t]he decision as to whether a permit will be issued must rest primarily
upon the effect of the proposed work on navigation").
37. See, e.g., United States v. Republic Steel Corp., 155 F. Supp. 442 (N.D. Iii. 1957), rev'd
and vacated, 264 F.2d 289 (7th Cir. 1959), rev'd, 362 U.S. 482 (1960). The case involved a
discharge of industrial solid wastes into the Calumet River; nevertheless, the controversy was
focused solely on the issue of navigability. See also United States v. Perma Paving Co., 332
F.2d 754 (2d Cir. 1964); United States v. New York Cent. R.R., 252 F. Supp. 508 (D. Mass.
1965) aff'd per curiam, 358 F.2d 747 (1st Cir. 1966).
38. Pub. L. No. 85-624, § 2, 72 Stat. 564, 16 U.S.C. §§ 662(a)-(b) (1970) (amending 16 U.
S.C. § 662 (1952)). The original Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act was passed by Congress on
March 10, 1934. See Pub. L. No. 73-121, § 1, 48 Stat. 401. In substance, it had provided that
where it was not inconsistent with the primary use of a federal water impoundment project, the
federal fish and wildlife agencies should be given the opportunity to use the impoundment for
fish culture stations and migratory bird resting places. Id. The 1958 Amendments required that
the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service be consulted in connection with any federal project or permit
having the effect of modifying any stream or body of water. 16 U.S.C. § 662(b)(1970). In
addition to directing these consultations, the Amendments also require the Secretary of the
Interior to make a report and recommendations concerning wildlife. These reports are based
upon the surveys and investigations by the Fish and Wildlife Service. See id. It should be noted,
however, that the Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act, as amended, does not give any sort of
veto power to either the Fish and Wildlife Service or to the Secretary of the Interior. Their roles
are strictly advisory, and the agency constructing or permitting the water resource project is
free to disregard their advice. See A. REITZE, supra note 16, at Two-51 through Two-59 for a
useful general discussion of the 1958 Amendments to the Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act.
39. See A. RErrZE, supra note 16, at Two-34 through Two-35. See also id. at Two-51
through Two-53.
40. The text of the Memorandum of Understanding is set forth at 33 C.F.R. § 209.129, App.
B (1976).
41. See id. § 290.120, App. B, Policy 1, at 393.
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the Secretary of the Army also agreed that no District Engineer would be
allowed to issue a Department of the Army permit under the 1899 Act over
the official objections of the appropriate Regional Director of the Fish and
Wildlife Service. 4 2 If disputes arose, they would be forwarded through
43
appropriate channels to the offices of the two Secretaries for resolution.
More recently, a formalized procedure for eliciting Interior Department
views on prospective or pending litigation in connection with violations of
the 1899 Act has also been established. 44
In the year following the adoption of the Memorandum of Understanding, the Corps of Engineers amended its regulations to require a "public
interest review" of all applications for permits under the 1899 Act.4 5 In
substance, these regulations provide that consideration of a Department of
the Army permit application includes not only an examination of the proposed activity's impact on navigability but also an evaluation of the activity's effect on any other aspect of the public interest. 46 Federal attention had
thus begun to focus on the regulatory powers suggested by Dern and its
47
companions.
The broad scope of these regulatory powers soon became evident.
Zabel v. Tabb4 8 was the first major decision which upheld the Corps of
Engineers' authority to rely solely on ecological grounds in denying a
private landowner's application for an 1899 Act permit for work in navigable waters:
The starting point here is the Commerce Clause and its expansive
reach. The test for determining whether Congress has the power to
42. See id., Procedure 4, at 394.
43. Id., Procedures 4-7, at 394. See also Conservation Council v. Costanzo, 398 F. Supp.
653 (E.D.N.C.), aff'd 528 F.2d 250 (4th Cir. 1975). In a suit to enjoin the issuance of a
Department of the Army permit to a private developer, one of the grounds for relief asserted by

the conservation organization was an alleged violation of the Memorandum of Understanding.
Although the District Court found the possibility of internal irregularities within the Department

of the Interior, it concluded that no interagency disagreement had arisen and, therefore, that the
"disputes provision" of the Memorandum had never come into play. 398 F. Supp. at 665-66,

673.
44. 33 C.F.R. § 209.120(g)(12)(ii) (1976). The current format for consultations between the
Corps of Engineers and the Fish and Wildlife Service on violations occurring in the Eastern

District of North Carolina is discussed in notes 102-105 infra and accompanying text.
45. 33 C.F.R. § 209.120(f)(1) (1968).
46. Other aspects of the public interest include the effect of the proposed work on
navigation, fish and wildlife, conservation, pollution, esthetics, ecology and the general public

interest. Id.
47. This shift in the government's attention reflected growing public concern over intensifying pressures to develop the nation's natural resources, including its waterways and wetlands. This concern was recognized in Congress which articulated a national policy aimed at
restoring and preserving the natural condition of those areas. See, e.g., National Estuary
Protection Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1221 (1970); Water Bank Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1301 (1970); FWPCA, 33
U.S.C. § 1251 (Supp. IV 1974).
48. 430 F.2d 199 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 910 (1971).
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protect wildlife in navigable waters and thereby to regulate the use of
private property for this reason is whether there is a basis for the
Congressional judgment that the activity regulated has a substantial
effect on interstate commerce. That this activity meets this test is
hardly questioned. In this time of awakening to the reality that we
cannot continue to despoil our environment and yet exist, the nation
knows, if Courts do not, that the destruction of fish and wildlife in our
estuarine waters does have a substantial, and in some areas a devastat49
ing, effect on interstate commerce.
Other courts have generally accepted Zabel as a correct interpretation of the
scope of federal regulatory powers under the Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act of 1899.50 The proposition now seems firmly established that if a
connection can be shown between a private owner's use of submerged or
tidal lands and navigability, the federal government has the right to control,
prevent or abate that use in order to accomplish any national purpose which
is within the scope of its powers under the commerce clause. Moreover, if
one accepts the dictum in United States ex rel. Greathouse v. Dern as law,
federal control of private uses can be exercised not only to promote commerce but to accomplish any purpose within the scope of the constitutional
powers conferred on the national government.
D.

The Federal Water Pollution Control Amendments of
1972 (FWPCA)
In its 1972 amendments to the Federal Water Pollution Control Act,5 '
Congress acted once again to reify inchoate public rights in the nation's
water resources. The stated purpose of the Federal Water Pollution Control
Act Amendments of 1972 is to create a public right to use water in a
physically, chemically and biologically pristine form. 52 To accomplish this
purpose, the operative provisions of the FWPCA grant executive agencies
53
the power to regulate certain private activities affecting water quality.
The regulatory approach embodied in the FWPCA follows the pattern
of earlier legislation: the statute attempts to preserve the public's rights by
49. 430 F.2d at 203-04 (citations omitted).
50. E.g., Sierra Club v. Morton, 400 F. Supp. 610, 635 (N.D. Cal. 1975); United States v.
Cannon, 363 F. Supp. 1045, 1051 (D. Del. 1973); United States v. Lewis, 355 F. Supp. 1132,
1134 (S.D. Ga. 1973); United States v. Underwood, 344 F. Supp. 486, 489 (M.D. Fla. 1972).
51. FWPCA.
52. Id. § 101(a), 33 U.S.C. §1251 (Supp. IV 1974).

53. The primary operative provision of the FWPCA is section 301(a), 33 U.S.C. §
1311(a)(Supp. IV 1974) which, with certain statutory exceptions, makes the discharge of any

pollutant unlawful. For a discussion of how section 301(a) ultimately acts to restrict private
activities in or around the waters of the United States, see notes 73-79 infra and accompanying
text. In essence, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(b)-(f), 1312, 1316, 1317, 1328, 1342 and 1344 (1970) establish

administrative permit programs through which otherwise unlawful discharges may be
authorized.
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regulating private activities and uses rather than asserting federal jurisdiction over territory. But the scope of the use controls created by the FWPCA
is potentially much broader than the scope of those created by the 1899 Act,
since both the range and number of activities affecting water quality are far
more extensive than those affecting navigability. So far, there has been no
attempt by the federal government to use the FWPCA for any purpose other
than the control of water quality; but should the dimensions of regulatory
power under this statute be viewed as analogous to those under the 1899
Act, the FWPCA could become a powerful instrument for more general
national planning.
II.

RESTRICTIONS ON PRIVATE ACTIVITIES AND USES CREATED
BY THE RIVERS AND HARBORS APPROPRIATION ACT OF
1899 AND THE FWPCA

The Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act of 1899 protects the public's right to unimpeded passage over the nation's watercourses, and the
FWPCA is directed toward keeping the waters of the United States free of
pollutants. Both statutes attempt to accomplish their respective ends by
regulating other activities that are inconsistent with the stated national
objectives. Since most, if not all, inconsistent activities are likely to occur
on submerged and riparian lands, the two acts effectively burden those lands
with negative or restrictive easements. This inquiry will next explore the
extent to which these easements restrict or control private land and water
resource use.
A.

Use Restrictions Under the 1899 Act and the Refuse Act

While each of the provisions of the Rivers and Harbors Appropriation
Act of 1899 restricts the private use of submerged and tidal lands to some
extent, the most important sections of the Act (and those that form the basis
for the most litigation) are sections 10 and 13. 51 Section 10 actually contains
three separate restrictions.55 The first forbids the creation of any obstruction
54. 1899 Act §§ 10,13, 33 U.S.C. §§ 403 and 407 (1970), respectively.
55. 33 U.S.C. § 403 (1970) provides as follows:
The creation of any obstruction not affirmatively authorized by Congress, to the
navigable capacity of any of the waters of the United States is prohibited; and it shall
not be lawful to build or commence the building of any wharf, pier, dolphin, boom,
weir, breakwater, bulkhead, jetty, or other structures in any port, roadstead, haven,
harbor, canal, navigable river, or other water of the United States, outside established harbor lines, or where no harbor lines have been established, except on plans
recommended by the Chief of Engineers and authorized by the Secretary of the
Army; and it shall not be lawful to excavate or fill, or in any manner to alter or modify
the course, location, condition, or capacity of, any port, roadstead, haven, harbor,
canal, lake, harbor or refuge, or inclosure within the limits of any breakwater, or of
the channel of any navigable water of the United States, unless the work has been
recommended by the Chief of Engineers and authorized by the Secretary of the Army
prior to beginning the same.
The Secretary of the Army has delegated his regulatory responsibilities under section 10 to the
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to the navigable capacity of any American waters without the affirmative
authorization of Congress. 56 The second portion of section 10 is somewhat
more specific; it prohibits the placing of structures in any "water of the
United States" without prior authorization from the Chief of Engineers and
the Secretary of the Army. 57 Neither of these provisions contains an express
limitation on the waters which are subject to federal protection; they appear
to apply with equal force to both navigable and non-navigable waters. One
qualification, however, has generally been considered implicit in the prohi-

bition against obstructions: the affected body of water should have reasonable potential for navigation. 58 Otherwise, there would be no "obstruction"
in any real sense. Given the requisite demand and the appropriate technol-

ogy, any body of water could conceivably become navigable, but the
traditional approach has been to confine the prohibition against obstructions
to waters which fall within three classes: waters which are presently navigable; waters which were once but are no longer navigated; and waters which
59
foreseeably might be used for navigation in the future.
There are also practical limitations on the restriction against obstruc-

tions to navigation. Ostensibly, an obstructive activity could be located
anywhere; in theory, the government would only have to show that the
activity either directly or indirectly affected the navigable capacity of some
body of water in order to secure its abatement. 6° The realities of administration and enforcement, however, effectively prohibit the government from
seeking the abatement of technically obstructive activities where the work
being performed is geographically remote from the affected body of water or
where the effect on navigation is imperceptible. 61 Similarly, while the 1899
Chief of Engineers. See 33 C.F.R. § 209.120, App. D (1976). The Chief of Engineers, in turn,
has delegated many of his regulatory responsibilities to local District Engineers. See e.g., id. §
209.120(f).
56. See 33 U.S.C. § 403 (1970), quoted in note 55 supra. For a discussion of the historical
development of the prohibition against obstructions, see notes 12-22 supra and accompanying
text.
57. 33 U.S.C. § 403 (1970).
58. See United States v. Appalachian Elec. Power Co., 311 U.S. 377,404-10 (1940); United
States v. Joseph G. Moretti, Inc., 478 F.2d 418, 428 n.36 (5th Cir. 1973). For further discussion
of "navigability" under the 1899 Act, see notes 65-69 infra and accompanying text.
59. E.g., Rochester Gas & Elec. Corp. v. FPC, 344 F.2d 594, 596 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
382 U.S. 832 (1965); United States v. Crow, Pope & Land Enterprises, Inc., 340 F. Supp. 25, 34
(N.D. Ga. 1972), appeal dismissed, 474 F.2d 200 (5th Cir. 1973); see United States v. Granite
State Packing Co., 343 F. Supp. 57, 60-61 (D.N.H. 1972)("a river navigable in the past remains
so in perpetuity so far as the power of Congress is concerned"), aff'd, 470 F.2d 303 (1st Cir.
1972).
60. See, e.g. United States v. Republic Steel Corp., 362 U.S. 482 (1960); Sanitary Dist. v.
United States, 266 U.S. 405 (1925). For an example under the earlier 1890 Act, see United
States v. Rio Grande Dam & Irrigation Co., 174 U.S. 690 (1899), discussed in note 14 supra.
61. In its latest regulations implementing FWPCA § 404, 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (Supp. IV 1974),
the Army Corps of Engineers has indicated that it will be asserting jurisdiction over certain
activities in non-navigable bodies of water which affect water quality. See 33 C.F.R. §§
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Act's prohibition of structures is not expressly confined to navigable waters,
there has traditionally been very little
federal interest in regulating structures
62
in non-navigable bodies of water.
The third prohibition contained in section 10 is the most general of all:
it forbids the alteration or modification of the "course, location, condition,
or capacity" of any navigable water. 63 In proscribing obstructions and
unauthorized structures, the first two provisions were clearly directed
against activities which have an adverse effect on public navigation. The
third provision, on the other hand, is not expressly confined to alterations or
modifications which diminish navigable capacity. Even activities which
arguably enhance navigability, such as digging canals or boat basins, 64 are
proscribed unless prior federal authorization has been obtained. The analogy
of an easement is almost inapposite to this third portion of section 10
because the owner of burdened l-nd normally has a right to uses which are at
least consistent with those of the easement holder.
In another respect, however, the prohibition against unauthorized modifications is somewhat more limited than the restrictions contained
elsewhere in section 10. In order for federal regulatory jurisdiction to attach,
an altered or modified body of water must be navigable. The Rivers and
Harbors Appropriation Act of 1899 does not define the term "navigable,"
but in implementing the Act the Corps of Engineers has adopted its own
definition: "Navigable waters of the United States are those waters which
are presently, or have been in the past, or may be in the future susceptible of
use for purposes of interstate or foreign commerce. '"65 This administrative
209.120(d)(2)(h),(i) (1976). This expansion of the Corps' regulatory activities may result in
increased interest in the control of less obvious obstructive activities which violate section 10 of
the 1899 Act.
62. See notes 35-36 supra and accompanying text. In addition to the government's policy
orientation, there are also several legal considerations which tend to diminish agency interest in

using the 1899 Act to regulate structures in unnavigable waters. The single most effective way
of dealing with most unauthorized structures is to initiate civil proceedings for a mandatory
injunction compelling removal. But injunctions are equitable remedies which normally require
some showing of irreparable harm. See notes 191-95, 209-11 infra and accompanying text. Piers
or other small structures in non-navigable waters would not appear to impede the flow of
waterborne commerce, and it can rarely be shown that they have an adverse effect on water
quality or other aspects of the environment. If a pressing need for removal cannot be shown, it
may be difficult to obtain equitable relief in the courts to enforce administrative control of such
structures. But see United States v. Venters, Civ. No. 986 (E.D.N.C. June 26, 1974), discussed
at note 190 infra and accompanying text.
63. 1899 Act § 10, 33 U.S.C. § 403 (1970).
64. See, e.g., Weiszmann v. District Eng'r, 7 E.R.C. 1523 (S.D. Fla. 1975), rev'd and
remanded on othergrounds, 526 F.2d 1302 (5th Cir. 1976). The Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act of 1896 probably formed the basis for this third portion of section 10. See Act of June
3, 1896, ch. 314, § 2, 29 Stat. 202, 234, discussed in note 16 supra.
65. 33 C.F.R. § 209.260(c) (1976). Compare the text accompanying notes 58-59 supra,
which discusses the non-statutory navigability requirements traditionally imposed under section 10's obstruction provision.
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definition of navigable waters is based on existing case law 66 and has
generally been accorded considerable deference by the courts. 67 Most courts
have also accepted the Corps of Engineers' view that a tidal body of water is

navigable up to its mean high water mark and that a non-tidal body of water
is navigable up to its ordinary high water mark. 68 There is, of course,
nothing magic about the mean and ordinary high water marks, and arguments could be made that navigability extends beyond these somewhat
arbitrary boundaries. 69 But from a practical standpoint, more would be lost
by abandoning these tests than might be gained in additional jurisdiction.
Both of these water levels are relatively easy to prove, and, if there were no

such convenient line of demarcation both for showing jurisdiction over an
activity and for establishing a limit on remedial work, enforcement litigation
would become considerably more complicated and concomitantly less
70
effective.
66. The Corps' three-prong test comports substantially with the test formulated by the
Second Circuit in Rochester Gas & Elec. Corp. v. FPC, 344 F.2d 594, 596, cert. denied, 382
U.S. 832 (1965). Various aspects of the Corps of Engineers' definition of navigable waters have
been considered by other courts on numerous occasions. An excellent discussion of the concept
of navigable waters under the 1899 Act can be found in Kramon, supra note 5, at 237-46 (1973).
67. See, e.g., United States v. Pot-Nets, Inc., 363 F. Supp. 812, 815 (D. Del. 1973). See
also Kramon, supra note 5, at 233-34, 238.
68. See United States v. Pot-Nets, Inc., 363 F. Supp. 812, 815-16 (D. Del. 1973); United
States v. Cannon, 363 F. Supp. 1045, 1049-51 (D. Del. 1973); United States v. Lewis, 355 F.
Supp. 1132, 1137 (S.D. Ga. 1973). On the Pacific coast, the Corps of Engineers considers the
limit of navigable waters to be the mean higher high water mark. 33 C.F.R. § 209.260(k)()(ii)
(1976). This also has received judicial approval. Sierra Club v. Leslie Salt Co., 412 F. Supp.
1096 (N.D. Cal. 1976). Without referring specifically to the Corps of Engineers' regulations,
several other courts have accepted the mean or ordinary high water mark as the shoreward limit
of federal jurisdiction under the Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act of 1899. See United
States v. Smith, 7 E.R.C. 1937 (E.D. Va. 1975); Weiszmann v. District Eng'r, 7 E.R.C.
1523,1525 (S.D. Fla. 1975), rev'd and remanded on other grounds, 526 F.2d 1302 (5th Cir. 1976);
United States v. Stoeco Homes, Inc., 359 F. Supp. 672, 676 (D.N.J. 1973), vacated and
remanded on othergrounds, 498 F.2d 597 (3d Cir. 1974); United States v. Joseph G. Moretti,
Inc., 331 F. Supp. 151, 158 (S.D. Fla. 1971), vacated and remanded on othergrounds,478 F.2d
418 (5th Cir. 1973).
69. See United States v. Sexton Cove Estates, Inc., 526 F.2d 1293, 1296-97 (5th Cir. 1976).
70. For example, assume that the government brings an action under the 1899 Act to obtain
removal of an unauthorized fill project which extends out into the water from clearly "dry"
land. Initially, the government faces the problem of proving that the project is being built in
"navigable waters" in order to show liability. Navigability is a factual question. See Crowell v,
Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 55 (1932); Arizona v. California, 283 U.S. 423, 452 (1931). Having the
mean high water mark as a convenient line of demarcation simplifies and limits the evidence
which the government will have to offer to show liability. Jurisdiction and, therefore, liability
can be established by showing that any part of the project extends waterward of the mean high
water. The precise location of the mean high water mark, however, will normally have to be
established in order to obtain a mandatory injunction compelling removal of the fill. The court
must have some way of knowing how much of the fill material to order the defendant to
remove. Without some simplifying device, such as the mean high water mark, establishing a
limit on remedial work could become a difficult task, if not an impossible one. See the
discussion in note 185 infra and accompanying text.
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'Section 13 of the Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act of 1899,
commonly known as the Refuse Act, forbids the placement of refuse
material in any one of three places: (1) in navigable waters of the United
States; (2) in any tributary of navigable waters from which refuse may float
or be- washed into such navigable water; and (3) "on the bank of any
navigable water, or on the bank of any tributary of any navigable water,"
where refuse will be liable to be washed into the navigable water, "either by
ordinary or high tides, or by storms or floods.''71 Unlike the somewhat
general provisions of section 10, the Refuse Act is quite specific both as to
the nature of the activities which are subject to regulation and as to the
territory in which regulated activites might take place. Unanswered questions concerning jurisdiction under the Refuse Act have largely been ren72
dered moot by passage of the FWPCA.
B.

Use Restrictions Under the FWPCA

The Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 197271 create
still another instrument for federal control of private activities in the nation's
waters and wetlands. Under section 301(a) of the FWPCA, it is unlawful to
"discharge any pollutant" unless the discharge has been authorized under
one of several permit programs established in other sections of the Act. 74 It
is not immediately obvious from section 301(a) that the statute is directed
against water pollution, but the term "discharge of a pollutant" is defined
by another provision as "any addition of any pollutant to navigable waters
from any point source . . . .
The Act defines the term "navigable
71.
72.

1899 Act §13, 33 U.S.C. § 407 (1970).
One potentially troublesome jurisdictional question under the Refuse Act was raised in

United States v. United States Steel Corp., 482 F.2d 439 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 909
(1973), in which the defendant argued that it was necessary for the government to show that a
discharge actually impeded or obstructed navigation before it could be forbidden by section 13.
The court of appeals disagreed, holding that "[t]he discharge of any refuse matter, regardless of

any apparent effect on navigation, is prohibited in the absence of a permit even if Congress
thought at the time of enactment that permits would not or could not be withheld on the ground

that the material discharged was merely a pollutant." 482 F.2d at 447. Alternatively, the First
Circuit appears to have taken the view that Congress contemplated forbidding even the

unauthorized discharge of pollutants at the time the Refuse Act was passed. See United States
v. Kennebec Log Driving Co., 491 F.2d 562, 569 n.23 (Ist Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 910
(1974). This and other similar problems were mooted by passage of the FWPCA, which clearly
prohibits unauthorized discharge of pollutants. See notes 73-79 infra and accompanying text.
73. FWPCA.

'74.

33 U.S.C. § 1311(a)(Supp. IV 1974): '-'Except as in compliance with this section and

sections 1312, 1316, 1317, 1328, 1342, and 1344 of this title, the discharge of any pollutant shall
be unlawful." The permit program most germane to this discussion is the one pertaining to
dredging and filling which is administered by the Corps of Engineers. See id. § 1344; 33 C.F.R. §

209.120(g) (1976).
75. FWPCA § 502(12), 33 U.S.C. § 1362(12)(Supp. IV 1974) provides:
The term "discharge of a pollutant". . . means (A) any addition of any pollutant to
navigable waters from any point source, (B) any addition of any pollutant to the
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waters" as "the waters of the United States, including the territorial sea." 76
The FWPCA is generally concerned with keeping the waters of the
United States in a pristine state for the public and for commercial users. The

Act attempts to accomplish this goal by regulating private activities that
affect water quality. But Congress has stopped short of attempting to assert

plenary control over every activity which may potentially affect the chemical, physical or biological characteristics of the nation's waters. On its face,

section 301(a) appears to be directed only against dischargesand not against
activities such as dredging, in which material is excavated or removed from
the water. 77 Moreover, in order for an activity to be subject to federal
control under the FWPCA, the discharge must emanate from an identifiable
"point source." 78 This would seem to exclude such pollution-producing
activities as agricultural run-off. Finally, there is also some question as to
whether the FWPCA can be used to prevent the erection of structures, such

as piers and wharves, in the absence of a showing that water quality is
79

actually affected.
By far, the most troublesome problem in defining the scope of the
FWPCA has been the identification of the "waters of the United States"
waters of the contiguous zone or the ocean from any point source other than a vessel
or other floating craft.
The term "pollutant" is defined in FWPCA § 502(6), 33 U.S.C. § 1362(6) (Supp. IV 1974):
The term "pollutant" means dredged spoil, solid water, incinerator residue, sewage,
garbage, sewage sludge, munitions, chemical wastes, biological materials, radioactive materials, heat, wrecked or discarded equipment, rock, sand, cellar dirt and
industrial, municipal and agricultural waste discharged into the water ....
For the definition of "point source," see note 78 infra.
76. FWPCA § 502(7), 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7)(Supp. IV 1974).
77. But see Weiszmann v. District Eng'r, 526 F.2d 1302, 1306 (5th Cir. 1976):
[Tihe district court correctly found that discharge of "sediment" from the dredging
amounted to a violation of the statutory prohibition against the discharge of a
"pollutant." Section 502 of the Act defines "pollutant" to include "dredge spoil." 33
U.S.C.A. § 1362. Nor can we find merit to Weiszmann's semantical assertion that the
evidence fails to show a statutory violation because it established merely a "spill"
into waters, rather than a "discharge."
78. See FWPCA § 502(12)(A), 33 U.S.C. § 1362(12)(A) (Supp. IV 1974); also see the discussion
in note 75 supra and accompanying text. The Act defines "point source" as follows:
The term "point source" means any discernible, confined and discrete conveyance,
including but not limited to any pipe, ditch, channel, tunnel, conduit, well, discrete
fissure, container, rolling stock, concentrated animal feeding operation, or vessel or
other floating craft, from which pollutants are or may be discharged.
FWPCA § 502(14), 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14) (Supp. IV 1974).
79. The question arises, for example, whether the driving of a wooden pile into a water
body's bed constitutes a "discharge of a pollutant" within the meaning of the FWPCA. (See the
definition of "pollutant" quoted in note 75 supra). If the construction of a pier or other
structure has no discernible effect on the chemical, physical or biological quality of the water, it
is doubtful whether this is the type of activity which the FWPCA is really attempting to reach.
On the other hand, applying the FWPCA to structures would serve a practical purpose for the
government. While section 10 of the Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act of 1899 prohibits
the construction of structures in any water of the United States, whether navigable or nonnavigable, that Act unlike the FWPCA contains no civil penalty provisions. In certain situations, a civil penalty may be the most appropriate enforcement remedy for an unauthorized
structure. See notes 115-19 infra and accompanying text.
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that are subject to protection from unauthorized discharges.80 Since the Act
is expressly concerned with water quality and not navigation, traditional
8
tests, such as the mean high water mark, would not appear to be useful. '
Within the last three or four years, several courts have struggled to define
"waters of the United States," as the term is used in the FWPCA,8 2 but little
case law with broad and practical applicability has emerged. The approach
still seems to be ad hoc. Without a precise set of facts before it, the District
Court for the District of Columbia could conclude only that "waters of the
United States," as used in the FWPCA, "is not limited to the traditional
tests of navigability" but rather includes the nation's waters to the maximum extent permissible under the commerce clause;8 3 the court did not
venture to suggest where the territorial limit might be. 84 Where a particular
discharge has been at issue, most courts have limited their opinions to
whether FWPCA jurisdiction exists over the area8 5in question and have not
attempted to fashion a general jurisdictional test.
In its new regulations implementing the FWPCA, the Corps of Engineers has taken an essentially territorial approach to jurisdiction. In substance, the regulations provide that FWPCA jurisdiction exists over all
identifiable bodies of water landward to their mean or ordinary high water
marks and also over all contiguous coastal and freshwater wetlands to the
extent that they are "periodically inundated" and are characterized by
certain types of vegetation normally associated with the periodic presence of
saline, brackish or fresh water. 86 Jurisdiction over noncontiguous wetlands
is left to the discretion of the individual District Engineers. 7 Initially, it
would seem that the phrase "periodically inundated" might be too impre80. See notes 75-76 supra and accompanying text for an explanation of how the term

"waters of the United States" controls the application of the FWPCA.

81. This has been the view of the courts. See, e.g., Conseivation Council v. Costanzo, 398
F. Supp. 653, 673-74 (E.D.N.C. 1975).
82. FWPCA § 502(7), 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7)(Supp. IV 1974).
83. Natural Resources Defense Council v. Callaway, 392 F. Supp. 685,686 (D.D.C. 1975).

84. See id.
85. See United States v. Smith, 7 E.R.C. 193 (E.D. Va. 1975); Weiszmann v. District Eng'r
7 E.R.C. 1523 (S.D. Fla. 1975), rev'd and remanded on other grounds, 526 F.2d 1302 (5th Cir.

1976); Leslie Salt Co. v. Froehlke, 403 F. Supp. 1292 (N.D. Cal. 1974); United States v.
Holland, 373 F. Supp. 665 (M.D. Fla. 1974); United States v. Ashland Oil and Transp. Co., 364
F. Supp. 349 (W.D. Ky. 1973), aff'd, 504 F.2d 1317 (6th Cir. 1974). In each case, the court was

concerned almost exclusively with determining whether FWPCA jurisdiction existed over the
precise area in controversy and not with fashioning a test for the limit of FWPCA jurisdiction.
In Conservation Council v. Costanzo, 398 F. Supj. 653, 668, 674 (E.D.N.C. 1975), Chief Judge
Larkins held that an area containing certain species of saline marsh vegetation and "flooded a

few times a year as a result of certain infrequent acts of nature" fell within the jurisdiction of
the FWPCA. This is the closest thing to a jurisdictional standard that has been proposed thus
far.
86. See 33 C.F.R. § 209.120(d)(2) (1976).
87. Id. § 209.120(d)(2)(i)(i).
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cise to be practical, since it could fairly be argued that even 100-year flood
plains are subject to periodic inundation. The added requirement of the
conjunctive vegetation test, however, should tend to keep federal action
within manageable limits and also to simplify the problems of proof in
88
enforcement litigation.
Im.

ADMINISTRATIVE ENFORCEMENT OF RESTRICTIONS CREATED BY

THE

1899 ACT AND THE FWPCA

As presently construed, the Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act of
1899 and the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972
taken together effectively create federal easements over most of the waters
and wetlands in the United States. The Army Corps of Engineers' Wilmington, North Carolina, District recently conducted a survey to assess the
changes in that District's regulatory responsibilities that have resulted from
the expanded concept of FWPCA jurisdiction. 9 The survey results illustrate
the magnitude of federal regulatory involvement with state and private land
and water resource use. Under either the 1899 Act or FWPCA, nearly
10,000 square miles, or approximately one-fourth of the total area covered
by the Wilmington District, will be subject to federal regulation.9" This
regulated area includes some 7,000 miles of tidal shoreline, 24,500 miles of
rivers, creeks and tributaries, 206,350 acres of coastal marshes, and
thousands of square miles of open water sounds stretching between the
Virginia and South Carolina state lines. 9 1 Enforcing federal restrictions on
water resource use in an area this large presents enormous practical
difficulties.
Given present resources, it is simply impossible to initiate legal action
in connection with every violation of federal water resource protection laws.
Even if sufficient resources were available, it is questionable whether every
violation should result in litigation. Some violations are simply unintentional, and the perpetrators are perfectly willing to undertake voluntary corrective action if given the opportunity. Moreover, many violations are committed by persons of limited means. Exposing every one of them to the expense
of complex and protracted litigation raises serious ethical, social and political questions. There is also the danger that resorting to litigation in every
case would create a political and legislative backlash that would imperil the
entire federal regulatory program. 92 Finally, and perhaps most importantly,
88. See notes 70 supra and 185 infra and accompanying texts for a discussion of the

importance of having a relatively clear-cut and simple test for proving jurisdiction and for
establishing a geographical limit for work to be ordered under a remedial injunction.
89. See U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS, WILMINGTON DISTRICT, PROGRESS IN CIVIL
WORKS, 1971-1980 (1975).
90. Id. at 4-5.
91. These figures are based on raw data which are summarized id.
92. See generally ENVIRONMENTAL LAW INSTITUTE, ENFORCEMENT OF FEDERAL AND STATE
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not equipped to handle several thousand
the federal court system is simply
93
enforcement actions every year.
Selective prosecution is one answer, but it is not a very satisfactory
one. While limiting prosecutions to major and flagrant violators may draw
public attention to the regulatory program, this practice also tends to make
minor violators feel secure. Moreover, as a practical matter, the effect of the
few serious violations, such as large unauthorized projects, may have less
serious consequences for national interests than the cumulative impact of
minor violations. 94 Selective enforcement may also place the government at

a disadvantage when seeking equitable relief in the courts. A showing that
the perpetrator's neighbors were allowed to proceed with similar but smaller
projects is bound to influence judicial awards of relief. 95
In order to protect the public's interest in navigability and water quality
effectively, every violation of federal use control laws should be detected
and exposed, and each violator should be called upon to rectify his wrong.
More important, there should be a practical, extra-judicial method for
resolving a majority of cases. Unfortunately, neither the Rivers and Harbors
Appropriation Act of 1899 nor the FWPCA provides the Corps of Engineers
WATER POLLUTION CONTROLS: A REPORT TO THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON WATER QUALITY

27-62 (1975)(discussing the practical enforcement difficulties encountered by the Environmental Protection Agency and state regulatory authorities in administering the FWPCA).
93. By way of example, the Attorney General's Annual Report for 1975 indicated that
during that fiscal year, seventy-five civil actions were initiated throughout the entire country to
enforce the provisions of sections 10 and 13 of the 1899 Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 403, 407 (1970), and
the dredging and filling provisions of the FWPCA, FWPCA § 404, 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (Supp. IV
1974). See [1975] Arr'Y GEN. ANN. REP. 131. The author's survey of the United States
Attorney's files for the Eastern District of North Carolina indicates that only ten of these civil
actions were initiated in the Eastern District. On the other hand, the survey also discloses that
eighty-five suspected violations of those laws had been reported by the Corps of Engineers'
Wilmington District to the United States Attorney for the Eastern District of North Carolina
and were pending as of January 1, 1977. If every one of these suspected violations were to
result in civil enforcement proceedings in federal court, the result in fiscal year 1977 would be a
750 percent increase in enforcement litigation from fiscal year 1975.
94. In the areas where the federal enforcement program is most effective, minor violations
are likely to present more of a problem than larger, more flagrant violations. Persons contemplating projects which involve considerable expenditures of time and money will usually opt for
the security of the administrative permit process rather than risk litigation and serious financial
loss. Moreover, unauthorized work on a large, visible project will normally attract immediate
federal attention. On the other hand, a small property owner building a pier with scrap lumber
rarely thinks in terms of potential financial loss, and his work is likely to escape attention for
some time. Also see notes 189-90 infra and accompanying text.
95. As a matter of law, the government would not be estopped from maintaining an
enforcement action, but it is questionable whether the government could obtain, for example, a
mandatory injunction compelling removal of the work. See notes 191-95 and 200-01 infra and
accompanying text. Cf. United States v. Stoeco Homes, Inc., 498 F.2d 597 (3d Cir. 1974)(government surrendered its navigational servitude because it was the policy of the Corps of
Engineers not to require permits for the activity at issue at the time the work was actually
performed).
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with a means for convenient administrative resolution of enforcement matters. 96 Once a violation of the statutes administered by the Corps of Engineers is detected, current Department of the Army regulations provide for
issuance of a cease-and-desist order. 97 This directive simply advises the
apparent violator that he is violating the law and requests him to stop
performing the work until the matter is resolved. If there is non-compliance
with this cease-and-desist order, normal practice is to refer the matter
directly to the Department of Justice for appropriate criminal or civil

proceedings in federal court. 98 In short, the burden of enforcement is shifted
immediately from the administrator to the prosecutor, and it is the prosecutor who must evaluate the case from a distance and decide whether legal
action is warranted. If many violations are detected and handled in this

fashion, one of two things is likely to occur: either prosecution will be
declined in a majority of cases or the federal district court docket will
become filled with criminal and civil enforcement actions. Neither is a
particularly desirable result.
In the Eastern District of North Carolina, 99 federal agencies have found
that expanding the administrative process beyond what is required by law or
regulation offers a partial alternative to judicial enforcement proceedings,
Upon receipt of a reported violation from the field, the Corps of Engineers'
Wilmington District reviews available information to determine whether one
of the laws it administers has been violated. 100 If a violation is apparent, the
96. Under FWPCA § 309(a)(3), 33 U.S.C. § 1319(a)(3)(Supp. IV 1974), the Administrator of
the Environmental Protection Agency may issue an "administrative order" directing a person
violating section 301(a) of the Act to comply with the law; if the order is ignored, the
Administrator may commence a civil action to enforce it. He may not, however, assess and
collect civil penalties; this is within the exclusive province of the courts under FWPCA § 309(d),
33 U.S.C. § 1319(d). In any event, under FWPCA § 404, 33 U.S.C. § 1344, the Corps of
Engineers is charged with the responsibility for administering the FWPCA as it relates to
dredging or filling activities. The Act does not provide for the issuance of administrative orders
by the Corps of Engineers. This gap might be filled by future amendments to the Federal Water
Pollution Control Act, but it is questionable whether this is really necessary. See notes 109-12
infra and accompanying text.
97. 33 C.F.R. § 209.120(g)(12)(i) (1976).
98. Id. § 209.120(g)(12)(ii)(a)(l). Referral can often be a cumbersome procedure. The
District Engineer sends a report to his Division Engineer who, in turn, refers'the matter to the
Office of the Chief of Engineers in Washington, D.C. The case is then forwarded to the
Attorney General who eventually sends it back to the local United States Attorney for prosecution. In certain limited situations, the Corps of Engineers' regulations provide for referral of an
enforcement action directly from the District Engineer to the local United States Attorney. Id.
§§ 209.120(g)(12)(i) and (ii)(a)(2). The recent trend has been toward enlarging the District
Engineer's direct referral authority.
99. North Carolina's Eastern Federal Judicial District is comprised of the state's easternmost forty-four counties, or somewhat less than half of its total area. All of North Carolina's
coast and coastal plain lies within the Eastern District.
100. A standard violation reporting system has been developed within the Eastern District.
Local federal and state agencies concerned with the protection of waterways and wetlands have
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Corps issues a cease-and-desist order and requests the person performing the
work to provide a written report on the activities within ten days.10 1 Copies
of all cease-and-desist orders are furnished to the federal and state agencies
which participate in reviewing Department of the Army permit applications,10 2 and each agency is requested to make an on-site inspection of the
work within thirty days and to report its findings and recommendations to
Attorney's office also
the District Engineer. 10 3 The local United States
04
receives a copy of each cease-and-desist order.
The procedure outlined above has several important advantages over
past practice. Traditionally, the Corps of Engineers has had to rely primarily
on its own limited resources to investigate and evaluate violations. Today,

many agencies, each having special expertise and perspectives, are involved
in the earliest stages of the enforcement process. The additional information
provided to the Corps of Engineers by these agencies significantly reduces
the possibility of error in the administrative process. 105 The immediate and
obvious mobilization of federal enforcement resources also helps to create
an atmosphere that is conducive to administrative resolution of violations.
After a cease-and-desist order has been issued and all requested reports
been provided with an "Investigation Report Form" (SAW Form 421, Nov. 26, 1974), which
has been distributed to all of their personnel in the field. One side of the form has space for
recording essential factual information about the suspected violation. The back of the form has
been stamped with the Corps of Engineers' address in Wilmington, North Carolina, and is
franked. When a field inspector from any one of the participating agencies detects a suspected
violation, he fills out the form and folds, staples and mails it to the Wilmington District Office.
This procedure has yielded two benefits. First, the Corps of Engineers' regulatory personnel
are effectively augmented by dozens of field inspectors from other agencies, and second, the
Corps normally receives initial notice of a violation within a few days of its occurrence.
101. 33 C.F.R. § 209.120(g)(12)(ii) (1976).
102. Corps of Engineers regulations require solicitation of the views of appropriate federal,
state and local agencies on early construction permit application. Id. But no procedure has been
established for meeting this requirement. See id. In the Wilmington, North Carolina District,
cease-and-desist orders are normally sent to the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, the National
Marine Fisheries Service, the Environmental Protection Agency, the North Carolina Division
of Environmental Management, the North Carolina Division of Marine Fisheries and the Real
Property Section of the North Car6lina Department of Administration.
103. Upon completion of its field inspection, each agency is requested to complete a rather
lengthy "Comments and Recommendations Report" which includes detailed physical and
biological descriptions of the area surrounding the unauthorized work. This information not
only affords a basis for requesting that remedial work be performed, but if judicial proceedings
ultimately result, the reports provide the United States Attorney with detailed information
about the facts of the case and the testimony of prospective witnesses.
104. When he receives a copy of a cease-and-desist order, the United States Attorney is
immediately alerted that a violation is in progress and that a temporary restraining order may be
required on short notice. The cease-and-desist order normally contains a brief description of the
location and nature of the work and sufficient additional information to enable the United
States Attorney to draw a complaint without a further exchange of correspondence.
105. Administrative oversights may affect the nature of relief available to the government in
judicial proceedings. See notes 200-204 infra and accompanying text.
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have been received, the Corps of Engineers is then in a position to select an
appropriate enforcement approach. In the event that the violator chooses to
ignore the District Engineer's directive to stop the unauthorized work the
prosecutor has already been alerted and normally has sufficient information
about the facts to initiate judicial proceedings immediately.10 6 Experience
indicates, however, that this is rarely necessary. When faced with an almost
instantaneous federal response, most persons will stop and opt for an
administrative solution if given the choice. 107 Assuming that the work does
stop, enough information about the violation will have been gathered at this
point to enable the Corps of Engineers to determine what further administrative action may be appropriate.
At this stage of the enforcement proceeding, the Corps of Engineers'
Wilmington District normally attempts to distinguish unauthorized work
that is susceptible of restoration to the status quo ante from work that is not.
Where it appears reasonable to require some remedial work to correct a
violation, the Corps of Engineers' cease-and-desist order is customarily
followed by an informal administrative order directing the responsible party
to perform specified remedial work; the stated alternative to compliance is
referral of the matter to the United States Attorney for appropriate criminal
or civil proceedings. In other jurisdictions, this step is omitted and the
matter is referred for judicial proceedings without giving the potential
08
defendant any informal opportunity to correct his wrong.1
A violator is not obliged by law or regulation to obey the Corps of
Engineers' administrative restoration order; the only impetus to obey is the
threat of litigation. 109 Interestingly enough, however, this practice did not
106. See note 104 supra and accompanying text. Cease-and-desist orders are normally sent
to the violator by certified mail. As soon as the receipt is returned to the Corps of Engineers,

the project is kept under surveillance to ensure that the work has, in fact, stopped. If the work
continues, the United States Attorney is notified by telephone to seek a temporary restraining
order. Once a complaint is filed and a temporary restraining order is sought, responsibility for
the case passes from the Corps of Engineers to the Department of Justice. This shift in

responsibility narrows the range of options available to the person performing the work for he
no longer has the opportunity to resolve the conflict within the somewhat more flexible
framework of the administrative process.

107. According to an informal survey by the author, 179 violations of the 1899 Act and
FWPCA were reported to the United States Attorney by the Corps of Engineers' Wilmington

District during 1976. Of this number, only one appears to have required the entry of a
temporary restraining order. See also ENVIRONMENTAL LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 92, at 27:
"Successful regulation depend[s] upon the consent of the regulated, who [have] the power to
frustrate officially-declared objectives if they [choose] to do so." The mood of the regulated
often depends on how effectively the government wields both the carrot and the stick.

108. See 33 C.F.R. § 209.120(g)(12)(i) (1976).
109. Several considerations support an administrative approach to restoration. To begin
with, the procedure is not without precedent. The FWPCA expressly provides for the issuance
of administrative orders by the Environmental Protection Agency. See note 96 supra. Similarly, there is no real conceptual difference between an administrative restoration order and a

written demand for a debt due or a demand for tender of performance under a contract; both are
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begin as an intentional effort to compel corrective work extrajudicially. It
was prompted by difficulties encountered in seeking equitable relief in the
courts. The primary judicial instrument for compelling a party who has
violated the 1899 Act or FWPCA to rectify his wrong is the mandatory
injunction. 110 An equitable remedy, the mandatory injunction compelling
restoration or removal of unauthorized work is not routinely available to the
government and will normally not be issued where the equities favor a
defendant. 1 1 Prior to the advent of administrative restoration orders, many
defendants would raise the allegation that they would have been willing to
correct their unauthorized work voluntarily had they been given the opportunity, as a defense to or in mitigation of the government's claim for relief.
Perhaps such pleas were meritorious, for restoration or corrective work is
112
now being performed voluntarily in a majority of cases.
In any event, if a person performing unauthorized work complies
voluntarily with the Corps of Engineers' administrative restoration order,
the United States Attorney is so advised, and the matter normally ends
there. 113 If the violator refuses to comply, the Corps of Engineers refers the
matter for legal proceedings. As a practical matter, every case involving a
refusal to perform corrective work must be referred for litigation or the
prerequisites for obtaining judicial relief in appropriate contexts. And as a matter of fundamental fairness, it seems that a violator should be apprised of what the government expects of him
before he is actually served with a civil or criminal complaint.
Consider also the practical effect of a successful challenge to an administrative restoration
order in the courts. If the order is set aside, the Corps of Engineers is obliged by regulation to
cease all further efforts toward administrative resolution and to refer the matter to the Department of Justice for legal action. See 33 C.F.R. § 209.120(g)(12)(i) (1976). The violator will have
gained nothing but a second law suit and will have effectively deprived himself of the option to
resolve the conflict informally. Moreover, the validity of an administrative order would have no
effect on the government's right to initiate subsequent civil proceedings. See United States v.
New York Cent. R.R., 252 F. Supp. 508, 512-13 (D. Mass. 1965), aff'dpercuriam, 358 F.2d 747
(1st Cir. 1966).
110. See notes 188-90 infra and accompanying text.
Ill. See notes 191-95 infra and accompanying text.
112. According to the informal survey taken by the author, of the 179 violations reported
within the Eastern District in 1976, ten (5.6%) resulted in civil legal proceedings, eighty-four
(47%) were resolved voluntarily in the administrative process, three (1.7%) are awaiting initiation of legal proceedings, and eighty-two (45.7%) are awaiting administrative resolution. Based
on cases actually resolved during that year, the District Corps of Engineers is achieving a
voluntary compliance rate of 89%.
113. Upon receipt of notification from the Corps of Engineers that corrective work, if any,
has been satisfactorily completed, the United States Attorney normally advises the Corps of
Engineers by letter, with a copy to the person performing the work, that legal action will not be
initiated and that the United States Attorney's file is being closed. In theory, a legal action
could be initiated regardless of whether voluntary corrective work had been performed, but it is
questionable whether a court of equity would be willing to give the government any remedy at
all unless there were some additional federal regulatory interests to be vindicated. Such a
practice might also discourage people from participating in the administrative process and
would amount to a waste of the Justice Department's limited resources.
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whole concept of extrajudicial enforcement breaks down. While some
unauthorized work is undoubtedly the result of simple ignorance or inadvertence, there are also many cases where the work was knowingly undertaken
as a financial risk. Where a project may result in significant economic gain
but clearly would not have been permitted by federal authorities if application had been made in advance, only the certainty of enforcement litigation
will induce voluntary compliance with an administrative restoration
14
order. 1
Notwithstanding the current dearth of formal administrative procedures
for enforcing federal restrictions on the use of waterways and wetlands,
experience in the Wilmington District indicates that at least one practical
method of prompting voluntary compliance is available to the agencies. No
such method exists, however, where correction of the violation is impractical or unnecessary. For example, the Corps of Engineers occasionally finds
that it would have granted a permit for unauthorized work if the person
performing it had applied in advance. A court of equity would be understandably reluctant to require dismantling of a structure or removal of a fill if
the defendant could subsequently obtain permission to perform identical
work. 1 5 In short, there is no clearly legitimate basis for an administrative
restoration order in such cases. 116 On the other hand, simply allowing the
work to remain in place without subjecting the owner to any penalty
disadvantages others who take the time and trouble to apply for permits in
advance. One solution is to impose a fine or civil penalty upon parties who
fail to obtain permits for their work, but this is currently possible only by
court order. "17
The result is an anomalous situation. Minor and less serious violations
are more apt to result in litigation than serious violations which require
extensive corrective work simply because administrative agencies lack the
114. For example, the Corps of Engineers will rarely, if ever, issue a permit for large-scale
filling in coastal wetlands. On the other hand, there is tremendous demand for water-front
property and the supply is limited and decreasing steadily. Financial gain from such a project
can therefore be considerable. If a developer believes that there is a good chance that he can
ultimately avoid a mandatory injunction compelling him to remove the fill, he will be unlikely to
pay much attention to an administrative restoration order.
115. See United States v. Joseph G. Moretti, Inc., 478 F.2d 418 (5th Cir. 1973).
116. In the absence of a reasonable expectation that an administrative restoration order will
be enforced by a judicial decree, there is simply no inducement for the person performing the
work to obey it. Thus, in order to make this enforcement instrument effective, it is incumbent
on the Corps of Engineers to remain continuously aware of all developments in the law of
remedies. Conversely, the courts can be of great assistance to administrative agencies and, at
the same time, reduce their enforcement workloads by developing uniform and predictable
rules for the application of mandatory injunctive relief. See notes 209-11 infra and accompanying text.
117. The civil penalties authorized by FWPCA § 309(d), 33 U.S.C. § 1319(d)(Supp. IV 1974),

may only be imposed judicially. See FWPCA § 309(b), 33 U.S.C. § 1319(b). The Rivers and
Harbors Appropriation Act of 1899 contains no provision authorizing civil penalties.
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means to deal effectively with the former. Legislation is required to correct
this anomaly: by giving the Corps of Engineers and the Environmental
Protection Agency the authority to impose and collect civil penalties for
certain classes of minor violations, a great deal of largely unnecessary

litigation could be eliminated. I" At a minimum, provision should be made
to allow minor cases to be heard by United States Magistrates rather than
burdening the United States District Courts.119
No matter how sophisticated the administrative enforcement process

may become, there will always be some violations which can only be
resolved judicially. An example of such a situation is presented by the recent
case of United States v. Gblden Acres, Inc. 12 0 In that case, a developer
filled some wetland areas adjacent to the Atlantic Intracoastal Waterway.
Before any enforcement action was taken, portions of the filled areas were
subdivided into lots and sold to purchasers who had no knowledge that the
filling had been unauthorized. The violation was serious, but the court was
sensitive about requiring the defendant to perform remedial work on land
belonging to innocent purchasers who were not parties to the litigation.121
The solution was to require restoration of the areas still owned by the
defendant and to impose a civil penalty in connection with the fill that had
118. For example, under 46 U.S.C: § 1484 (Supp. IV 1974), the United States Coast Guard is
empowered to assess and collect civil penalties for violations of the Federal Boat Safety Act of
1971, id. §§ 1451 et seq. If administrative efforts to collect the penalty fail, judicial enforcement
proceedings are limited to a relatively simple action on a debt of record. Id. § 1484(d) provides
that proceedings to collect fines not in excess of $200 may be brought before United States
Magistrates. See also 33 C.F.R. § 1.07 (1976)(administrative regulations implementing the civil
penalty provisions of the Federal Boat Safety Act).
There has been growing support in recent years for administrative imposition of civil
money penalties. See Goldschmid, Report in Support of Recommendation 72-6: An Evaluation
of the Presentand Potential Use of Civil Money Penaltiesas a Sanction by FederalAdministrative Agencies, in 2 ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES RECOMMENDATIONS

AND REPORTS 896 (1972); Recommendation 72-6: Civil Money Penalties as a Sanction, in
ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, supra, at 67. For a discussion of some of
the impediments to such programs, see Comment, The ConstitutionalRights to Trial by Jury
and AdministrativeImposition of Money Penalties, 1976 DUKE L.J. 723.
119. Under 18 U.S.C. § 3401 (1970), a United States Magistrate has jurisdiction to hear only
criminal cases involving "minor offenses." A minor offense is statutorily defined as "misdemeanors punishable under the laws of the United States, the penalty for which does not exceed
... Id. §
imprisonment for a period of one year, or a fine of not more than $1,000, or both.
3401(f). Because of their potential severity, the criminal fine provisions of the FWPCA and
those that accompany sections 10 and 13 of the 1899 Act, see notes 125-28, 131 infra and
accompahying text, place both of these statutes outside the jurisdiction of the United States
Magistrates. See generally Doub & Kestenbaum, Federal Magistratesfor the Trial of Petty
Offenses: Need and Constitutionality, 107 U. PA. L. REv. 443 (1959). A magistrate has nojurisdiction to try or decide a civil enforcement action. See 28 U.S.C. § 636 (Supp. IV 1974).
120. No. 76-0023-CIV-4 (E.D.N.C. Jan. 13, 1977).
121. See id., slip op. at 6-7. The precise ground for declining to compel restoration of the
area which had been subdivided and sold was that the purchasers had not been made parties to
the action. The court offered no opinion as to what the result might have been if the purchasers
had been joined as parties defendant. Id. at 7.
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already been sold. Such a case requires adjudication and is not really
amenable to administrative resolution. 122 A similar problem exists where a

violation is serious but restoration would do more harm than good. 123 In
such a situation, the solution may be to impose a large civil penalty or to
restrict the defendant's future use of the unauthorized work. 124 Cases such as
these require a careful weighing of the equities and competing policy
considerations, a function best performed by a neutral body and not by one
of the adversaries.
IV.

JUDICIAL ENFORCEMENT OF RESTRICTIONS CREATED BY
THE 1899 ACT AND THE FWPCA

When representing the United States in judicial proceedings to enforce
the restrictions created by the Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act of 1899
and the FWPCA, a United States Attorney stands in a somewhat different
position from counsel for a private litigant attempting to enforce easement
rights. The outcome of each enforcement action affects the public's view of
the federal regulatory program as a whole. Defendants are also members of
the public and have a right to expect that the law will be administered fairly
and uniformly, and the prosecutor must therefore make every attempt to be
consistent in his approach to similar violations. On the other hand, every
case has its peculiarities, and it is not always easy to categorize cases or to

develop completely uniform approaches. What is important is that the
prosecutor have a rational basis for his various approaches to different types
of violations and that he be prepared to explain to the public, as well as to
the courts, his reasons for proceeding differently in apparently similar cases.
122. Where restoration would affect persons who are probably not liable for a violation, an
administrative restoration order will rarely be appropriate. Cf. United States v. Stoeco Homes,
Inc., 498 F.2d 597 (3d Cir. 1974). Even if the Corps of Engineers possessed this authority to
assess and collect civil penalties, see notes 117-18 supra and accompanying text, the question
arises whether this is really a situation where a civil penalty should be administratively
imposed. The district court in Golden Acres heard a great deal of evidence and carefully
calculated a civil penalty which would effectively deprive the defendant of any monetary gain
he had realized as a result of the unauthorized work. See United States v. Golden Acres, No.
76-0023-CIV-4, slip op. at 7-8 (E.D.N.C. Jan. 13, 1977). Such determinations have traditionally
been a part of the judicial, and not the administrative, process.
123. For example, refilling an illegally excavated canal might cause more harm to fish and
wildlife than allowing it to remain.
124. If one objective of enforcement is to ensure that a defendant does not profit from his
unauthorized work, a prohibitory injunction restricting future use of the illegal fill area or
structure might serve this purpose. Any argument that such restrictions amount to an uncon-stitutional taking in violation of the fifth amendment would seem to be negated by the existence
of the government's paramount navigational easement and by the fact that the property was
created illegally. Cf. United States v. Stoeco Homes, Inc., 498 F.2d 597, 607-08 (3d Cir. 1974).
On the other hand, if the work has already disrupted the environment or adversely affected
other national interests, but is being allowed to remain in place for some reason of policy, it is
questionable whether it would be in society's best interest to allow the property to remain
completely unproductive in perpetuity.
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While a United States Attorney may often face a complicated task in
initiating legal proceedings to enforce the 1899 Act and the FWPCA, his
burden is alleviated somewhat by the availability of several forms of relief
which are unavailable to a private litigant. Perhaps the most significant
advantage possessed by the government is that it has the option of using the
criminal process to enforce its rights. In addition, within the general
framework of civil proceedings, the United States has at its disposal not only
the traditional actions for damages or for an injunction but also the right to
request that a monetary penalty be assessed against the defendant. In certain
situations, the government also has the power to employ its own resources to
abate unauthorized activities extrajudicially and later to proceed civilly to
recover the costs of its self-help efforts.
A.

CriminalPenalties

Both the Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act of 1899 and the Federal
Water Pollution Control Act of 1972 contain criminal provisions. Section 12
of the 1899 Act makes it a misdemeanor to violate any of the provisions of
section 10 and requires a fine of $500 to $2500 or up to one year imprisonment (in the case of a natural person) or both. 11 Similarly, section 16 of the
1899 Act 2 6 makes it a misdemeanor to violate any of the provisions of
section 13,127 commonly known as the Refuse Act; the punishment is the
same as.for violations of section 10, except that a minimum period of
of
incarceration of thirty days is prescribed for natural persons. 128 No proof
129
scienter appears to be required for conviction under the 1899 Act.
The 1972 Amendments to the Federal Water Pollution Control Act also
provide for criminal penalties, but proof that a violation was willful or
negligent is required for conviction. 130 On the other hand, the penalties are
somewhat more harsh. Conviction under the FWPCA exposes the defendant
to punishment "by a fine of not less than $2,500 nor more than $25,000 per
day of violation or by imprisonment for not more than one year, or both."131
125. 1899 Act § 12, 33 U.S.C. § 406 (1970).
126. Id. § 16, 33 U.S.C. § 411 (1970).
127. Id. § 13, 33 U.S.C. § 407 (1970).
128. Id. § 16, 33 U.S.C. § 411 (1970). The minimum period of imprisonment detracts from

the usefulness of section 16 as an instrument for dealing with relatively minor violations.
129. See, e.g., United States v. White Fuel Corp., 498 F.2d 619, 622 (1st Cir. 1974): "In the
seventy-five years since enactment, no court to our knowledge has held that there must be
proof of scienter; to the contrary, the Refuse Act has commonly been termed a strict liability

statute." In United States v. Standard Oil Co., 384 U.S. 224, 230 (1966), the Supreme Court
expressly declined to rule on the point since the issues on appeal were restricted. There does

not appear to be anything definitive in the case law concerning a scienter requirement for a
violation of section 10, cf. United States v. Raven, 500 F.2d 728, 731 (5th Cir.. 1974), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 1124 (1975), but it is generally felt that the same approach would be taken as in
the Refuse Act.
130. See FWPCA § 309(c), 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(Supp. IV 1974).
131. Id.

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 1977:347

In some districts, the courts have added a new dimension to criminal
proceedings by requiring the defendant to perform corrective work as a
32
condition of probation.1

Criminal prosecution has several advantages from the enforcement

perspective. First, since the stigma which results from a criminal conviction
is far greater than that which attaches to an unsuccessful defendant in a civil
action, it can be argued that proceeding criminally creates a greater deterrent. 133 An even greater advantage is the speed with which the criminal
enforcement process can be completed. Criminal cases have fewer timeconsuming steps than civil cases. 134 Also, because of their statutory priority,
criminal cases are normally set for trial well in advance of contemporaneously filed civil cases.1 35 Finally, the practice of making corrective work a
condition of probation would appear to give criminal cases much of the
36
remedial flexibility normally present in civil enforcement proceedings.1
Notwithstanding the advantages of proceeding criminally, the practice
within the Eastern District of North Carolina has been to avoid use of the
criminal process to enforce the provisions of the 1899 Act and the
FWPCA. 137 There are a number of reasons for this practice. Criminal
prosecutions under these two statutes cannot be tried by United States
Magistrates and must be placed on the district court's calendar. 13 8 Adding
significant numbers of enforcement cases to the criminal docket in a small
judicial district can create a tremendous burden on the entire court system. 139 In addition to the burden it imposes on the courts, the criminal
132. See Kramon, supra note 5, at 259-60 n.130.
133. But see note 188 infra and accompanying text, discussing the formidable burden which
a civil restoration order may place on a violator.
134. For example, Civil Rule 7(E) of the Local Rules of the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of North Carolina provides for a 120-day discovery period commencing at
the time that the answer or other responsive pleading is filed. This period can be extended on a
showing of good cause. Discovery may be followed by pre-trial conferences and hearings
pursuant to Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Criminal actions, on the other
hand, must follow a much more rapid timetable. See, e.g., The Speedy Trial Act of 1974, 18
U.S.C. §§ 3161-3174 (Supp. IV 1974).
135. Rule 50(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that "[p]reference shall
be given to criminal proceedings as far as practicable." FED. R. CRIM. P. 50(a).
136. See Kramon, supra note 5, at 259-60 n. 130. But see notes 191-95 infra and accompanying text for the proposition that the defendant may have a right to an evidentiary hearing on the
propriety of restoration. There may be a question as to whether the criminal process affords a
defendant an adequate opportunity to be heard on this issue.
137. An examination of the District's files discloses that no criminal enforcement proceedings have been initiated in the Eastern District within at least the last three years. This is not to
say, of course, that criminal proceedings might not be entirely appropriate in the case of a
particularly flagrant violation.
138. See note 119 supra and accompanying text.
139. A civil enforcement action normally requires the services only of an Assistant United
States Attorney and a United States District Judge; the Clerk of the Court and the United States
Marshal Service may also be affected to a small degree. A criminal enforcement action, on the
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process has other disadvantages for the government as well. While many
civil enforcement proceedings are heard by a court of equity, 14° a criminal
14 1
defendant under the 1899 Act or FWPCA is entitled to trial by jury.
Moreover, the perspective of jury members is normally limited to the case
before them, while the courts are more likely to have a broader view. By
considering the federal regulatory system as a whole, judges are more apt to
produce consistent enforcement results. Other difficulties of employing the
criminal process include the loss of the advantages of the liberal civil rules
of discovery and the much more stringent burden of proof which is imposed
on the government in criminal cases.
Apart from the specific problems encountered in criminal proceedings,
there is also the larger question of whether the criminal courts are suitable
forums for resolving conflicts over land and water resource use. An enforcement action under the 1899 Act or the FWPCA often involves a variety of
technical issues, policy considerations and equitable factors. While criminal
prosecution may be entirely appropriate in an egregious case, it would
appear that most enforcement matters require the kind of thoughtful and
searching inquiry that can only be obtained in the more relaxed and flexible
42
framework of a civil proceeding.1
B.

Injunctive Relief

Section 12 of the Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act of 1899
expressly provides that the removal of any structure erected in violation of
section 10 of the 1899 Act143 may be enforced by injunction. 144 In United
other hand, requires that the already burdened United States Probation Office assume a role in
the proceedings and that the Clerk of the Court and the Marshal Service accelerate and

intensify their efforts in order to keep pace with requirements for timely arrest, arraignment,
bond hearings, etc. See The Speedy Trial Act of 1974, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161-3174 (Supp. IV 1974).
140. The seventh amendment only guarantees a right to trial by jury in "suits at common
law." Where, as is often the case, civil enforcement proceedings under the 1899 Act and the
FWPCA involve only a demand for injunctive relief, it seems clear that no right to trial by jury
is available. See United States v. Louisiana, 339 U.S. 699, 706 (1950). The one situation in
which it is established that trial by jury is available to a defendant is where the government uses
its own resources to restore or remove unauthorized work and then initiates a civil action to
recover the cost. See notes 151-55 infra and accompanying text. Such an action is simply an
action for debt, see United States v. Perma Paving Co., 332 F.2d 754, 758 (2d Cir. 1964), a
traditional common law action in which a jury is normally required. 5 MOORE's FEDERAL
PRACTICE 38.19[1] (2d ed. 1951). See generally H. Goldschmid, supra note 118; Comment,
supra note 118.
141. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The maximum penalties provided by the FWPCA and Act
of 1899, see text accompanying notes 125-31 supra, are too severe to circumvent the right to
jury trial by classifying the violations as petty. See, e.g., Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66,
68-69 (1970).
142. See notes 191-95 infra and accompanying text.
143. 1899 Act § 10, 33 U.S.C. § 403 (1970).
144. Section 12 provides:
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States v. Republic Steel Corp. ,14 the Supreme Court held that injunctive

relief is also available to enforce any other provision of the 1899 Act.
According to the Court, such flexibility is necessary to ensure that the
purposes of the Act are fully accomplished. Subsequent case law has shown
that the types of injunctions available to enforce the provisions of the 1899
Act are as varied as the principles of equity and the minds of lawyers can
conceive.146 A similar range of injunctive remedies appears to be available
to enforce section 301(a) of the FWPCA.1 47
The prohibitory and mandatory injunction each have an important role
in the enforcement of federal water resource legislation. The most obvious
use of the prohibitory injunction is to restrain a defendant from violating an
administrative directive to stop unauthorized work until judicial proceedings
can be completed. 148 More subtle is the function that prohibitory injunctive
relief can serve in a permanent decree. At first, it may seem superfluous to
restrain a defendant from-performing further unauthorized work as part of a
final order, since he is merely being told not to violate the law again-an
obligation which is already imposed on him by statute. But in cases where a
real threat of further unauthorized work exists, a permanent prohibitory
injunction can serve a practical purpose: when its entry is accompanied by
retention of jurisdiction by the court, future violations can be handled by a
mhe removal of any structures or parts of structures erected in violation of the
provisions of [section 10] may be enforced by the injunction of any district court
exercising jurisdiction in any district in which such structures may exist, and proper
proceedings to this end may be instituted under the direction of the Attorney General
of the United States.
1899 Act § 12, 33 U.S.C. § 406 (1970).
145. 362 U.S. 482, 491-92 (1960). The case reversed a Seventh Circuit holding that section
12's explicit authorization of injunctive relief only to abate unauthorized structures, see note
144 supra, effectively precluded the use of injunctions for any other purpose under the 1899
Act. See United States v. Republic Steel Corp., 264 F.2d 289, 304 (7th Cir. 1959).
146. For examples, see notes 148-50, 188-90 infra and accompanying text.
147. See FWPCA § 301(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1319(b)(Supp. IV 1974). United States v. Smith, 7
E.R.C. 1937 (E.D. Va. 1975), and United States v. Holland, 373 F. Supp. 665 (M.D. Fla. 1974),
provide examples of cases where injunctions have actually been entered under the FWPCA.
148. Such use is contemplated in the All Writs section of the Judicial Code, 28 U.S.C. § 1651
(1970), and in Rule 65 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. In determining whether to enter a
preliminary injunction, most courts follow some variation of the four-part test originally set
forth in Virginia Petroleum Jobbers Ass'n v. FPC, 259 F.2d 921 (D.C. Cir. 1958), and consider:
(1) whether the plaintiff is likely to prevail on the merits; (2) whether the plaintiff is likely to
suffer irreparable injury in the absence of a preliminary injunction; (3) the extent to which the
injunction may cause harm to other parties interested in the proceeding; and (4) where the
public interest lies. In enforcement proceedings under the 1899 Act and the FWPCA, these
factors will normally favor the government. Moreover, at least one court has held that the
government need not make a showing of irreparable harm in order to obtain an injunction to
enforce the provisions of the 1899 Act. See United States v. Sexton Cove Estates, Inc., 389 F.
Supp. 602, 609 (S.D. Fla. 1975), rev'd and remanded on other grounds, 526 F.2d 1293 (5th Cir.
1976). But see United States v. Stoeco Homes, Inc., 498 F.2d 597, 611 (3d Cir. 1974); United
States v. Kentland-Elkhorn Coal Corp., 353 F. Supp. 451, 455 (E.D. Ky. 1973).
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relatively simple contempt proceeding rather than by initiation of an entirely
new lawsuit. 149
Perhaps the single most effective instrument for enforcing federal
control over private activities in waters and wetlands is the mandatory
injunction. 150 In most cases, -the purposes of the 1899 Act and the FWPCA
are best achieved by compelling the defendant to undo what he has unlawfully done by restoring the affected waters and wetlands, as nearly as
possible, to their status quo ante. The public can thereby regain use of the
affected water for navigation and enjoy the benefits of having the waters and
wetlands in their pristine state. The cost and effort associatedi with restoration also create an effective deterrent to others contemplating similarly
unauthorized work. It should be emphasized, however, that despite its
unique appropriateness, the mandatory injunction is an equitable remedy
which is only available at the discretion of the court. In order to develop a
scheme for determining when mandatory injunctive relief is appropriate, it
is first necessary to examine the other civil remedies which are available to
the government in enforcing water resource legislation.
C.

Self-Help and Damages

While no specific statute explicitly authorizes federal agencies to use
their own resources to remove unauthorized work; that prerogative has been
implied in certain situations. In United States v. New York Central Railroad,151 for example, the Corps of Engineers was permitted to act on its
own to remove a collapsed bridge which was limiting a river's navigable
capacity.15 2 The dimensions of self-help were further explored in United
States v. Perma Paving Co., 153 where the United States was allowed to
recover the cost of dredging a shoal from a riparian owner after his misuse of
his property had obstructed a navigable river. 154 In so ruling, Judge Friendly
made a strong case for self-help in the protection of water resources:
The remedy of damages is less burdensome to the defendant since it
relieves him of having to undertake a task which he may have neither
the knowledge nor the skill to perform or supervise. More important, it
149. Upon government submission of affidavits documenting that the defendant is continuing the work from which he was enjoined, the proceeding would probably take the form of a
hearing to show cause why the defendant should not be held in contempt.
150. See, e.g,, United States v. Golden Acres, Inc., No. 76-0023-CIV-4, slip op. at 6
(E.D.N.C. Jan. 13, 1977).
151. 252 F. Supp. 508 (D. Mass. 1965), aff'd per curiam, 358 F.2d 747 (1st Cir. 1966).
152. The Railroad Company's negligence was shown to have caused the collapse, which in

turn caused the obstruction. See 252 F. Supp. at 512-13.
153. 332 F.2d 754 (2d Cir. 1964).
154. The property, which was owned by the City of New York and leased to a contractor
who was authorized to place fill materials upon it, was low and swampy, and the fill had the
effect of forcing the underlying mud out into the river. See id. at 756.
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assures the United States the speedy and competent removal of an
obstruction to navigation which may be vital to the avoidance of accidents imperiling life, limb or property, to the interests of commerce, or
even to the national defense. We can think of no sensible reason why
Congress should have desired that if the executive branch chooses to
effect immediate removal of an obstruction, through the services of the
Corps of Engineers or otherwise, rather than resort to the slower
injunctive process of the courts, the offender should thereby escape his
55
due. 1
Notwithstanding the broad warrant for self-help in the Perma Paving case,
the Corps of Engineers has generally been reluctant to use its own resources
to remove unauthorized work. In part, this may be the result of a lack of
15 6
confidence that self-help remedies will always be upheld by the courts.
A cautious approach to self-help can eliminate much of the uncertainty
surrounding its use. A good example is provided by the recent decision in
United States v. Peele,'157 where the government initiated a civil action to
compel removal of a fishing pier, the construction of which had originally
been permitted by the Corps of Engineers. After the pier was built, the
owner failed to maintain proper navigational lights, and his permit was
revoked. As an alternative to a mandatory injunction compelling removal of
the pier, the government sought a declaratory judgment that it had the
authority to remove the structure and that the owner would be liable for the
cost of removal. 158 The district court ordered the defendant to remove the
pier within sixty days; at the expiration of that period, the government was
authorized to remove the structure and bill the owner for the cost.15 9 The
declaratory judgment provides a sure way for the government to establish
the propriety of self-help in a given case before it performs the work.
To date, self-help has been specifically upheld only where the unauthorized work constituted an actual obstruction to navigation.16° Neverthe155. Id. at 758.
156. It would be very rare for an agency such as the Corps of Engineers to have funds

appropriated for the specific purpose of removing unauthorized activities. If, for some reason,
the agency were unable to recover the cost of removal or restoration, the officer having fiscal
responsibility would undoubtedly be very concerned that he might be questioned about misappropriation of funds.
157. No. 75-0001-CIV-2 (E.D.N.C. Apr. 19, 1976).

158. The fishing pier in question was not attached to the shore but stood out in the water
approximately two and one-half miles from the nearest land. The alternative prayer was
prompted by evidence that defendant lacked both the means and expertise to remove the pier

himself. See id, slip op. at 8. See also United States v. Perma Paving Co., 332 F.2d 754,758 (2d
Cir. 1964)(lack of expertise considered).
159. No. 75-0001-CIV-2, slip op. at 9.

160. In United States v. New York Cent. R.R., 252 F. Supp. 508 (D. Mass. 1965), there was
a specific finding by the court that the collapsed bridge constituted an "unreasonable obstruction to navigation."Id. at 510, 512. Such a finding was also essential to the decision in United
States v. Perma Paving Co., 332 F.2d 754, 758 (2d Cir. 1964). In United States v. Peele, the
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less, the underlying rationale appears to support the use of this remedial
device in any case where unauthorized work has a discernible effect on
either navigability or water quality. United States v. Underwood 161 lends
some support to this proposition. In that case, the government initiated a
civil action alleging that the defendant had violated section 10 of the 1899
Act by dredging the Weeki Wachee River without a Department of the
Army permit. As relief, the government sought an order compelling restoration of the riverbed and shoreline to their original condition or, alternatively,
damages equal to the cost of such restoration. In granting the government's
motion for summary judgment on the issue of liability, the court noted the
right to self-help by way of dictum: "Where the party causing the injury to
navigable waters refuses to remedy the situation or for some other reason the
United States is compelled to perform the remedy, the government is
62
entitled to the equivalent cost in damages." 1
It should be emphasized, however, that although the courts will imply
civil liability to reimburse the government for the costs of restoration,
damages cannot be awarded unless the government has actually performed
the restoration work. Otherwise, a monetary award would be in the nature of
a civil penalty, for which the 1899 Act makes no provision. 163 Even if a
simple, pre-restoration damage remedy could lawfully be implied, it may be
questioned whether the cost of restoration would be the proper measure.
Damages are normally compensatory in nature. 164 Prior to performing corrective work, the only harm for which the government could seek compensation would be the diminution in value of the water resources affected by
the unauthorized work, and this loss need bear no particular relationship to
the cost of restoration.
D.

Civil Penalties

Unlike the Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act of 1899, which does
not include any provision for civil penalties, the FWPCA explicitly provides
for judicial imposition of civil penalties of up to $10,000 per day of
violation in addition to, or in lieu of, other relief. 165 The civil penalty
provisions of the FWPCA significantly increase a court's ability to fashion a
judgment to fit the particular circumstances of a given case. The preferred
mandatory injunction remedy is not always equitable or feasible. For example, in United States v. Arnett, 166 the government brought an action under
unlighted pier in question was outside the normal navigation channels but in an area frequented
by small fishing craft. No. 75-0001-CIV-2, slip op. at 4-5 (E.D.N.C. Apr. 19, 1976).
161. 344 F. Supp. 486 (M.D. Fla. 1972).
162. Id. at 494.
163. See United States v. New York Cent. R.R., 252 F. Supp. 508, 512 (D. Mass. 1965).

164. See generally D.

DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES

165. FWPCA § 309(d), 33 U.S.C: § 1319(d)(Supp. IV 1974).
166. No. 75-0008-CIV-7 (E.D.N.C. Apr. 14, 1976).

§ 3.1 (1973).
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both the 1899 Act and the FWPCA to compel the defendant to remove an
unauthorized bulkhead and fill project. 167 The defendant had taken steps to
secure a Department of the Army permit for most of the work but had failed
to have it validated; in addition, the contractor performing the work had
misread the permit specifications and had placed the bulkhead out in the
water some twelve feet beyond where the Corps of Engineers had directed
that it be placed. To make matters worse, the contractor died after completing the work, leaving the defendant with no recourse against him. In
imposing a fairly substantial civil penalty upon the defendant, the district
court commented on the inappropriateness of injunctive relief in this unusual
situation:
The Government's arguments for mandatory injunction in this case are
both substantial and persuasive. Mandatory. injunction, however, is an
equitable remedy and the propriety of granting such relief depends on
the facts and circumstances of the particular case. Here, there clearly
was no intent on the part of the defendant to violate or even evade the
law. The violations occurred as a result of a combination of inadvertence, errors in judgment, several mistakes, and an element of pure
chance. . . Considering all of the facts of this case, restoration
appears practicable, but the wrong occurring here does not justify the
application of mandatory injunctive relief.'6
Under certain circumstances, then, equitable considerations may simply
preclude imposition of a mandatory injunction, and the civil penalty will
provide the most satisfactory remedy for resolving the case. Situations in
which unauthorized work would have been permitted if application had been
made in advance, 169 where restoration would do more harm than good, 170 or
where a violation has already been vindicated under state law' 7' are
illustrative.
Unfortunately, the civil penalty is unavailable as relief in many of the
contexts in which it could be most useful. Unlike the Rivers and Harbors
Appropriation Act of 1899, the FWPCA does not necessarily prohibit the
building of unauthorized structures. 172 As a result, civil penalties may have
167. The bulkhead extended out beyond the mean high water mark of a navigable sound,
and after it was constructed, the area which it confined was filled. As is frequently the case, the
work violated both sections 10 and 13 of the 1899 Act as well as the FWPCA: the bulkhead was
an unauthorized structure under section 10, and the fill was prohibited as an unauthorized
modification of the navigable capacity of the sound. See 1899 Act § 10, 33 U.S.C. § 403 (1970).
Moreover, the fill was both a prohibited discharge of refuse under section 13, 33 U.S.C. § 407
(1970), and an unlawful discharge of a pollutant under section 301(a) of the FWPCA, 33 U.S.C.

§ 1311(a)(Supp. IV 1974). All potential bases for relief were alleged in the complaint.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.

No.
See
See
See
See

75-0008-CIV-7, slip op. at 8 (E.D.N.C. Apr. 14, 1976).
note 115 supra and accompanying text.
note 123 supra and accompanying text.
notes 205-08 infra and accompanying text.
note 79 supra and accompanying text.
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only limited value as an instrument for enforcing federal control over that
type of activity.
In sum, a variety of remedies is available to the government when it
seeks judicial enforcement of the restrictions on land and water resource use
which have been created by the Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act of
1899 and the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments. Unauthorized activities frequently fall within the scope of both statutes, thereby
increasing the range of available remedies. 7 3 When he files his complaint,
the United States Attorney may pray for all the relief in his arsenal, but
within this broad prayer there is normally some particular remedy or combination of remedies that best satisfies the interests of the overall federal
regulatory program. In short, there is usually a difference between the relief
which the prosecutor is seeking and the relief he expects to obtain. An early
and accurate assessment of realistic expectations for relief will enhance the
possibility of settling the case and will shorten the time consumed at trial if
efforts to compromise should fail. 174 The final section of this Article will
deal with the problem of identifying the most appropriate remedy for
particular types of cases. In particular, the discussion will revolve around
what is perhaps the single most effective remedy available to the government-the mandatory injunction requiring restoration.
V.

ENFORCING THE PROVISIONS OF THE

1899 ACT

AND THE

FWPCA:

THE AVAILABILITY OF MANDATORY INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

The most common type of legal proceeding to enforce provisions of the
1899 Act or the FWPCA is a civil action for equitable relief against the
owner of the property upon which the unauthorized activity has occurred. In
theory, any party participating in a violation, such as a lessee or a contractor, may be joined as a party defendant and held civilly liable, 175 but
restoration of an area can probably be demanded only of the owner. If a
party other than the owner were the object of a restoration order, the result
would be a court-ordered trespass to land, the propriety of which is obviously subject to question.176
173. For example, see note 167 supra and accompanying text.
174. In United States v. Golden Acres, No. 76-0023-CIV-4 (E.D.N.C. Jan. 13, 1977), the
defendant stipulated to liability and also that restoration was the most appropriate remedy for
the fill areas which he still owned. The only issue that had to be tried was the appropriate
remedy for that portion of the fill area which had changed ownership. The trial took less than
three hours. See notes 120-22 supra for a further discussion of the case.

175. See, e.g., United States v. Perma Paving Co., 332 F.2d 754 (2d Cir. 1964)(lessee liable
for creating obstruction to navigation). For the proposition that an owner may be vicariously
liable for unauthorized work performed by his contractor, see United States v. Arnett, No.
75-0008-CIV-7 (E.D.N.C. Apr. 14, 1976), and the discussion thereof at notes 166-68 supra and

accompanying text.
176.

Cf. United States v. Golden Acres, Inc., No. 76-0023-CIV-4, slip op. at 7 (E.D.N.C.
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While civil actions involving water resource uses are normally brought
by the federal government, it should be emphasized that the United States is
not the only potential plaintiff in such cases. There may also be other parties
whose interests are closely allied with those of the United States and who

may have claims against a property owner performing unauthorized work.
For example, the work might result, either directly or indirectly, in a
trespass to the land of another private owner. In addition, many states have
regulatory programs that are comparable to those of the federal government,1 77 or claim title to submerged and tidal lands within their boundaries. 178 Thus, an unauthorized filling of submerged lands could result in
liability to the United States under the Rivers and Harbors Appropriation
Act of 1899 and the FWPCA, 179 to the state or to a private owner of
submerged lands in trespass, and to the state under its water resource

protection laws. Although state or private claims may, in some cases,
support a mandatory injunction for removal of the fill, 8 0 these other parties
may have difficulty in asserting those claims within the context of a federal
enforcement action. The extent to which either the 1899 Act or the FWPCA
creates a federal cause of action for states or private parties is very unclear. 18 1 and if a district court should lack federal question jurisdiction over
Jan. 13, 1977)(court refused to order restoration after defendant had sold property to innocent
purchasers), discussed at notes 120-21 supra and accompanying text.
177. For example, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 113-229 (1975) (amended 1975), creates a state regulatory program which is roughly comparable in scope and application to the federal program under
section 404 of the FWPCA, 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (Supp. IV 1974). Failure to obtain requisite state
permits can form the basis for either criminal or civil proceedings. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§
113-229(k) and (1)(Supp. 1975). See also Georgia Water Quality Control Act, GA. CODE ANN.,
ch. 17-5, §§ 17-501 et seq. (1971); Illinois Environmental Protection Act, Title III: Water
Pollution, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 111 1/2, §§ 1011 et seq. (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1977).
178. The State of North Carolina claims title to submerged lands up to the mean high water
mark. See Carolina Beach Fishing Pier, Inc. v. Carolina Beach, 277 N.C. 297, 303, 177 S.E.2d
513, 516 (1970). The State Land Act of 1959 provides that land under navigable waters, i.e.,
submerged lands up to the mean high water mark, cannot be conveyed in fee but that easements
can be granted. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 146-3 (1974). See also S.C. CONST. art. XIV.
179. An unauthorized fill project normally violates sections 10 and 13 of the 1899 Act, 33
U.S.C. §§ 403, 407 (1970), and may violate FWPCA § 301,33 U.S.C. § 1311 (a)(Supp. IV 1974).
See United States v. Arnett, No. 75-0008-CIV-7 (E.D.N.C. Apr. 14, 1976), discussed at notes
166-68 supra and accompanying text.
180. See, e.g., O'Neal v. Rollinson, 212 N.C. 83, 192 S.E. 688 (1937); cf. State v. Brooks,
279 N.C. 45, 181 S.E.2d 553 (1971) (injunction not granted).
181. Opinions on the extent to which the Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act of 1899
creates a federal cause of action for private plaintiffs vary widely among the circuits. Some
hold that the Act's remedies are available only to the federal government and that private
parties must look to state law for relief against work performed in navigable waters. See, e.g.,
Red Star Towing & Transp. Co. v. Department of Transp., 423 F.2d 104 (3d Cir. 1970). See also
Lavagnino v. Porto-Mix Concrete, Inc., 330 F. Supp. 323, 325-26 (D. Colo. 1971)(court's view
appears to be that private actions are "limited to actions for injury in the use of navigable
waters for the purposes of navigation"). The Fifth Circuit's position is unclear. CompareBass
Anglers Sportsman Soc'y v. United States Steel Corp., 324 F. Supp. 412 (N.D., M.D. and S.D.
Ala.), aff'd sub nom. Bass Anglers Sportsman Soc'y v. Koppers Co., 447 F.2d 1304 (5th Cir.
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the particular claims of a state or private owner, their presence as plaintiffs
in enforcement proceedings would have to be supported by some other basis
182
for subject matter jurisdiction.
Assuming that appropriate parties are before the court, few substantive
legal issues presently remain as to either the reach of federal jurisdiction or
the extent of liability under the 1899 Act or the FWPCA. 183 In general, both
acts are currently viewed as absolute liability statutes. t8 4 In actions brought
under the 1899 Act, the government normally must show only that the
unauthorized work occurred below the mean or ordinary high water mark of
some navigable water body in order to establish both jurisdiction and
liability. If this fact is not obvious from the nature of the disputed work, a
field survey may have to be conducted to establish the mean high water
mark with reference to the property in question. While this may be timeconsuming, it rarely presents serious technical difficulties.1 85 As for viola1971), with Neches Canal Co. v. Miller & Vidor Co., 24 F.2d 763 (5th Cir. 1928). Case law from
the Fourth, Eighth and Ninth Circuits seems to indicate that a private action may be maintained
under the 1899 Act upon a showing that a particularized injury to the plaintiff has resulted from

the unauthorized activities. See James River & Kanawha Canal Parks, Inc. v. Richmond
Metropolitan Auth., 359 F. Supp. 611, 639, aff'd per curiam, 481 F.2d 1280 (4th Cir. 1973);
Sierra Club v. Morton, 400 F. Supp. 610, 622-25 (N.D. Cal. 1975); Hawkinson v. Blandin Paper
Co., 347 F. Supp. 820, 823 (D. Minn. 1972)(court tacitly assumes plaintiff's recovery is possible
on a proper showing of injury but denies relief on the facts). This point does not appear to have
been litigated under the FWPCA.
182. Assuming that the requisite jurisdictional amount is in controversy, either a state or
private party should be able to maintain a federal diversity action based on state law against a
non-resident land owner. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1970). In certain circumstances, a state or
private litigant might also be able to invoke a federal court's admiralty or maritime jurisdiction.
See id. § 1333.
183. See notes 65-72, 80-88 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of jurisdiction
under the Acts.
184. Although the absence of negligence or intent may be a consideration in fashioning the
appropriate remedy, see notes 166-68 supra and accompanying text, there is not even a
suggestion in the case law that the government is required to show that unauthorized work was
intentional or negligent in order to be entitled to civil relief under either the 1899 Act or the
FWPCA. Even the criminal provisions of the 1899 Act are generally acknowledged to contemplate absolute liability. See note 129 supra and accompanying text. The only occasion where the
government clearly is required to prove negligence or intent is where it proceeds criminally
under the FWPCA. See FWPCA § 309(c) 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c) (Supp. IV 1974).
185. See generally W. JOHNSON, D. JESSUP & P. CAMPBELL, LAYMAN'S GUIDE TO INVESTIGATING SECTION 10 VIOLATIONS 9-14 (1975)(Land and Natural Resources Division, Depart-

ment of Justice). The normal procedure is to obtain tide gauge readings in the vicinity of the
unauthorized work in order to establish the elevation of the mean high water mark in relation to
mean sea level. This information is normally quite readily available from the Department of
Commerce, which maintains tide gauges at frequent intervals along the coast. A survey party
then projects the elevation of the mean high water mark horizontally onto the property in
question and marks its limit with stakes.
The procedure is somewhat more complicated in the case of an unauthorized fill, since the
original elevation and contour of the property has been altered. The procedure here is to
establish the mean high water mark on each side of the fill by the method described above. In
simple cases, a straight line can be drawn between the two points. Where a straight line does not
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tions of the FWPCA, the relevant inquiry is whether the area in question is
"periodically inundated" and is characterized by certain types of vegetation
normally associated with the periodic presence of saline, brackish or fresh
water.18 6 In a majority of cases, these two elements can be proved by
conducting a biological inventory of the disputed property and by projecting
predicted tide elevations onto the area in question by means of a field
87
survey.1
Recent case law suggests that future litigation under the 1899 Act and
the FWPCA may be concerned primarily with questions relating to remedies. Of all the remedies available for enforcing federal restrictions on
private activities in American waters and wetlands, the mandatory injunction requiring restoration of the unauthorized work to the status quo ante is
probably the most effective. The burdens which restoration places on the
defendant create a significant deterrent and ensure that he will not enjoy any
benefits of his unauthorized work. 188 Restoration also gives the federal
government physical control over the navigability or quality of the affected
waters. Another advantage of the mandatory injunction which is often
overlooked is the role that remedy plays in protecting public water resource
rights from gradual encroachment. A single unauthorized project may cause
no appreciable harm to navigability or water quality by itself, but when it is
considered together with other similar projects, the cumulative impact may
be considerable. 189 The danger in allowing small and relatively insignificant
violations to remain in place is that they will most likely proliferate, and that
developing case law may someday preclude efforts to deal effectively with
the cumulative impact problem.19o
appear to provide a reasonable approximation, aerial photographs of the area taken before the

work was commenced normally reveal a vegetation line coinciding quite closely with the mean
high water mark. Scale aerial photographs of most coastal areas are taken at relatively frequent
intervals by the Department of Agriculture's Agricultural Stabilization and Conservation
Service.
186.

See notes 73-88 supra and accompanying text.

187. The process would be similar to the one described in note 185 supra, except that the
elevation of the highest predictable annual tide could be used in place of the elevation of the

mean high Water mark. The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration publishes
annual tide tables for the entire United States, and this information can normally be used to
compute the highest predictable tide in a particular locality.

188. In fact, restoration in certain situations may be so burdensome that a court may decline
to grant that remedy on equitable grounds. See notes 191-95 infra and accompanying text.

189. One small pier standing alone on the bank of a navigable river would probably have an
insignificant effect on the public interest. On the other hand, a small pier standing every fifty

feet along both banks of the river would effectively deprive the public of its full use of the
federal government's navigational servitude. The question arises whether this is not also a
problem even where the piers are authorized by the Corps of Engineers. In the future,

considerable administrative and judicial effort may be devoted to determining the "saturation
points" for various types of structures and activities.
190. United States v. Venters Holding Co., Civil No. 986 (E.D.N.C. June 26, 1974),
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Despite the clear advantages of the mandatory injunction in federal
water resource protection, a group of decisions from the Fifth Circuit clearly
indicates that this remedy will not be routinely available. In reversing
mandatory injunctions entered by the trial courts in United States v. Joseph
G. Moretti, Inc., 191 United States v. Sexton Cove Estates, Inc. 192 and
Weiszmann v. DistrictEngineer,193 the court of appeals held that a remedial
injunction could not be granted under the federal water resource statutes
-without the prior development of a factual record which established that the
choice of remedy was based on a complete examination of the circumstances, practicalities and equities of the particular case. 194 According to the
court, restoration should not be ordered without first giving the defendants
"an adequate opportunity before the district court to adduce evidence and
195
present their contentions with respect to the restoration issue."
An examination of the case law discloses a number of different factors
which might influence a court to limit the availability of mandatory injunctive relief. Some have been mentioned earlier in this discussion. For example, United States v. Golden Acres, Inc. 196 suggests that restoration may be
unavailable where title to the disputed property has passed into the hands of
innocent purchasers. 197 The Fifth and Ninth Circuits have both indicated that
restoration might also be inappropriate where its cost would be an unreasonable burden for the defendant to bear or where it would be technologically
infeasible to return the area to the status quo ante. 198 Still another limiting
factor might exist where restoration, though practicable, could cause greater
harm to the environment or to other national interests than allowing the work
199
to remain in place.
The equities of the government's position may also affect a court's
decision whether to order restoration. Although a number of cases indicate
presents a useful example of a situation in which a mandatory injunction was appropriate to
prevent a violation from growing to such an extent that it could no longer be controlled. The
case involved an addition to a restaurant. Constructed on pilings, the addition extended out
some seven feet beyond the high water line of a navigable river. See id., slip op. at 3. While it
seems clear that the seven foot extension did not create any real danger to navigation or the
environment, see id. at 2, the district court nevertheless required theremoval of the seven feet
of the addition. Id. at 3-4. The court seemed cognizant of the fact that allowing that intrusion on
navigability could make it difficult to enjoin similar future violations.
191. 526 F.2d 1306 (5th Cir. 1976).
192. 526 F.2d 1293 (5th Cir. 1976).
193. 526 F.2d 1302 (5th Cir. 1976).
194. 526 F.2d at 1310; 526 F.2d at 1301; 526 F.2d at 1304.
195. United States v. Sexton Cove Estates, Inc., 526 F.2d at 1301; accord, United States v.
Joseph G. Moretti, Inc., 526 F.2d at 1310.
196. No. 76-0023-CIV-4 (E.D.N.C. Jan. 13, 1977).
197. See notes 120-122 supra and accompanying text.
198. See United States v. Sexton Cove Estates, Inc., 526 F.2d 1293, 1301 (5th Cir. 1976);
United States v. Sunset Cove, Inc., 514 F.2d 1089, 1090 (9th Cir. 1975).
199. For an example, see note 123 supra.
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that neither laches nor estoppel may be raised to bar the government from
bringing an enforcement action, 200 such factors as misbehavior, delay or
other prejudicial actions by government officials appear to be appr6priate
considerations in fashioning a final decree. 20 1 Failure by the Corps of
Engineers to follow its own regulations in handling a violation may also
affect the remedy. In the earlier of its two Moretti decisions,2 °2 the Fifth
Circuit vacated the district court's restoration order and remanded the case
because the Corps of Engineers had failed to follow a regulation which
afforded a violator the opportunity to apply for an after-the-fact permit for
its unauthorized work. 20 3 This particular pitfall has been cured by a change
in regulations, 20 4 but other similar breakdowns in the administrative procegs
might well form a basis for postponing or denying mandatory injunctive
relief.
The extent to which remedies have already been imposed on the
defendant in state court proceedings may also be a pertinent consideration in
determining the appropriate federal remedy. As noted earlier, state proprietary and regulatory interests may exist concurrently with federal interests in
the nation's waters and wetlands. 205 Thus, certain unauthorized activities
may result in both federal and state judicial enforcement proceedings. If
federal regulatory interests have been totally vindicated in state court, it
would seem both unnecessary and inequitable to impose any federal remedy. 206 Even if federal interests have only been partly served by the relief
awarded in state court, the earlier result may influence the federal court's
200. E.g., Weiszmann v. District Eng'r, 526 F.2d 1302, 1305-06 (5th Cir. 1976); United
States v. Sunset Cove, Inc., 5 E.R.C. 1023, 1028 (D. Ore, 1973), aff'd in part, modified in part,

514 F.2d 1089 (9th Cir. 1975).
201.

See Weiszmann v. District Eng'r, 526 F.2d 1302, 1306 (5th Cir. 1976); United States V.

Sunset Cove, Inc., 5 E.R.C. 1023, 1028-29 (D. Ore. 1973); United States v. Lewis, 355 F. Supp.
1132, 1142 (S.D. Ga. 1973).
202. United States v. Joseph G. Moretti, Inc., 478 F.2d 418 (5th Cir. 1973), vacatingin part
331 F. Supp. 151 (S.D. Fla. 1971).
203. See 478 F.2d at 424-25, 430-32. 33 C.F.R. § 209.120(c)(I)(iv)(a)(i) (1972) provided that a
District Engineer was authorized to entertain an application for a permit for work already
completed "where the necessary primary authority, State or Federal as the case may be, validly
exists, when the work was innocently constructed, and where there is no objection to the
work."
204. 33 C.F.R. § 209.120(g)(12)(ii)(b) (1976) now provides that:
If criminal and/or civil action is instituted against the responsible person, the
District Engineer shall not accept for processing any application until final disposition of all judicial proceedings, including the payment of all prescribed penalties and
fines and/or the completion of all work ordered by the court.
205. See notes 177-78 supra and accompanying text.
206. For example, if the violation clearly involved work that would have been permitted if
application had been made in advance, a relatively modest civil penalty might be appropriate
relief. If the defendant had previously been fined in state court for the same work, the amount
of the fine would seem to be a factor which the federal court might wish to consider in
calculating the amount of a civil penalty.
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choice of remedy. In United States v. Arnett,20 7 for example, the district
court cited an earlier state criminal conviction and fine as20 8one of several
reasons for imposing a civil penalty in lieu of restoration.
Unfortunately, while Sexton Cove and its companion cases seem to call
for greater judicial attention to the remedial aspects of enforcement litigation, the Fifth Circuit made no real attempt to fashion a general test for
determining whether mandatory restoration orders are appropriate nor has it
set forth in any detail the matters which district courts should consider
before choosing a remedy. 20 9 Undoubtedly, the wide variety of possible
factual situations in which enforcement actions may arise complicates judicial efforts in this direction. One approach, however, might be to begin with
the general principle that restorationis presumptively the most effective and
therefore the most appropriate civil remedy for violations of the 1899 Act
and the FWPCA. The problem then becomes one of identifying the situations in which restoration is inappropriate. Once an exception to this
general rule has been identified, the actual grounds for denying a mandatory
injunction will frequently suggest the most suitable alternative remedy for
the case. For example, if the reason for denying restoration is that the
defendant lacks the means or expertise to perform it competently, then
permitting the government to restore the area and making the defendant
liable for restitution would seem to be the best alternative to a remedial
injunction. 2 10 Or, if restoration is withheld because the work would have
been permitted if proper authorization had been requested in advance, then
the objective of the remedy would be to deter others from bypassing the
administrative process, and a moderate civil penalty would seem to satisfy
the federal regulatory interest. In a case where the violation is serious but
restoration is impossible or impractical, a heavy civil penalty, calculated to
deprive the defendant of any gain from his unauthorized work, may be the
best solution. 2 11 In short, selecting the most suitable remedy in actions to
enforce the Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act of 1899 and the Federal
Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972 will become a relatively
easy task once the courts have clearly defined the factual settings in which
restoration is inappropriate.
207. No. 75-0008-CIV-7 (E.D.N.C. Apr. 14, 1976).
208. Id. slip op. at 8-9.
209. See the cases cited in notes 191-95 supra. In each of the three cases, the court of
appeals did not suggest how or even whether the district courts' original restoration orders
should be affected by the proceedings on remand. The mandate was simply for the lower courts
to develop a more complete record in the remedial aspect of the proceedings.
210. See notes 153-64 supra and accompanying text.
211. See note 122 supra.
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CONCLUSION

Under the commerce clause, the federal government has broad powers
to control the use of the country's water resources. No longer content to
restrict that power to the protection of water transportation, Congress and
the executive branch have, with the courts' approval, sought in recent years
to guarantee the public a broad spectrum of rights in the nation's water
resources. Both the Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act of 1899 and the
1972 Amendments to the Federal Water Pollution Control Act seek to
protect these rights by restricting inconsistent land and water resource uses.
In effect, the 1899 Act and the FWPCA burden submerged and riparian
lands with a federal water resource servitude. The federal government has a
broad range of remedial instruments at its.disposal in seeking to secure and
protect public rights over navigable waters and submerged and riparian
lands. But the enforcement task is extremely complex. It is complicated by a
variety of policy considerations; fairness, judicial economy and administrative efficiency are only a few. In order to maximize each of these interests,
efforts to enforce water resource legislation should begin with the administrative process. Additional legislation is needed to provide the appropriate
agencies with the remedial instruments which are required for effective
enforcement. Administrative civil penalties, administrative restoration and
cease-and-desist orders, and self-help procedures should all be considered.
The courts should have to be concerned with enforcing federal controls
on water resource use only when the administrative process is being defied
or when fairness requires that a case be adjudicated by a neutral body. The
range of judicial remedies presently available to enforce the provisions of
the 1899 Act and FWPCA is broad enough to enable the courts to arrive at a
just result in a majority of cases. But, for enforcement to be effective, these
remedies must be applied in a consistent and programmatic manner. Unfortunately, no general principles or standards have yet been adopted to guide
the application of particular remedies to particular cases. One approach
might be to establish the remedial injunction as the preferred remedy in
cases involving water resource violations and to direct future efforts toward
defining appropriate exceptions to this general rule. Such an approach
would promote equity and uniformity without unnecessarily restraining
judicial flexibility. Whether it is this test or another is unimportant. The
crucial point is that some coherent approach must be established soon. The
water resource enforcement process has matured a great deal in recent years,
and its future growth and effectiveness will depend largely on the guidance
it receives from the courts.

